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ABSTRACT
In the early 1990s many scientists claimed that there was a scientific
consensus that the anthropogenic production of greenhouse gases was causing
global warming. Carbon dioxide is produced in far greater quantities than other
greenhouse gases. Over 80 percent of the carbon dioxide produced in the United
States comes from coal-fired power plants. If global warming is a threat to the
welfare and survival of future generations, the United States, as one of the
greatest producers of greenhouse gases, has an obligation to reduce its
production of these gases.
In order to determine the most effective way to reduce the production of
greenhouse gases in the United States, this study examines recent efforts by the
Clinton and Obama administrations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from
coal-fired power plants. The Clinton and Obama administrations were selected
for this study because both administrations were Democratic, and both had
avowed political agendas to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. For the first two
years each administration enjoyed the support of Democratic majorities in both
Houses of Congress, and they had similar political support for the remainder of
their time in office.
This study will show that President Obama’s executive approach to
reducing carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants has been more
effective than the legislative approach of the Clinton administration. The study will
indicate that a scientific consensus about anthropogenic global warming and the
political will to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power plants did
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not exist during the 1990s. The study also shows that, despite the effectiveness
of the Obama administration in reducing carbon dioxide emissions, there are
many problems with the executive approach to the problem. The study suggests
that the Clean Air Act has ceded to much legislative power to the Executive
branch of government, and that success in reducing carbon dioxide emissions
from coal-fired power plants is too dependent on the will of the Executive.
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CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND

Introduction
In the fall of 1991, Donald Crane et al., wrote that, “Virtual unanimity
exists among scientists that anthropogenic releases of greenhouse gases
are forcing greenhouse warming even though there are uncertainties on
magnitude and rate of increase.”1 From the beginning of the 1990’s until the
present day, most environmental scientists have agreed that manmade
greenhouse gas emissions released into the atmosphere are causing
global warming.2 If it is true that the anthropogenic production of
greenhouse gas emissions is harming the environment and putting the
survival of current and future generations at risk, the United States has an
obligation to reduce its prolific production of such emissions.3 On June 12,
1992, the George H. W. Bush administration signed the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which the United
States Senate ratified on October 15th of that same year.4 In an Earth Day
speech on April 21, 1993, President William Clinton committed the United
States to reducing anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions to their 1990
levels.5 Thus, the United States established an international obligation to
reduce its production of greenhouse gases when the UNFCCC was
entered into force on March 21, 1994.6 Since this commitment was
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established, the United States has struggled to achieve this goal.
In order to determine the most efficient method to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions from the United States, this study will examine
two recent efforts to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired
electric power plants. The first effort to be examined is the Clinton
administration’s legislative approach. The second effort to be examined is
President Barack Obama’s executive order approach.

Carbon Dioxide Emissions
The regulation of carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power
plants should be examined for a number of reasons. According to the United
States Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) executive summary of the
“Inventory of U. S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2011,” total
greenhouse gas emissions rose from 6183.3 million metric tons of CO2
equivalent (Tg CO2 Eq.) in the year 1990 to 6702.3 Tg CO2 Eq. in 2011.
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This is an increase of 519.0 Tg CO2 Eq., or 8.4 percent, in total greenhouse
gas emissions over the twenty-one year period. Of the 6702.3 Tg CO2 Eq. of
greenhouse gas emissions that occurred in 2011, 5612.9 Tg CO2 Eq., or
83.7 percent, of those emissions were carbon dioxide.8 Of the total carbon
dioxide emitted in 2011, 5277.2 Tg CO2 Eq., or 94 percent, came from the
combustion of fossil fuels, and 2158.2 Tg CO2 Eq., or 38 percent, came from
electricity generation.9 Carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power
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plants were 1820.8 Tg CO2 Eq. in 1990. Therefore, carbon dioxide
emissions from the generation of electricity have increased 18.5 percent
over the same twenty-one year time span.10 This increase in carbon dioxide
emissions from electricity generators powered by fossil fuels constitutes 65
percent of the total increase in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 to
2011. In 2013, the EPA’s “Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions” reports
that coal combustion is responsible for 80 percent of the carbon dioxide
produced by electricity generation.11 Hence, coal-fired power plants
produced 1726.6 million metric tons of carbon dioxide in 2011, and coal-fired
power plants produced 52 percent of the total increase in greenhouse gas
emissions from 1990 to 2011. If the United States plans to reduce its total
emissions of greenhouse gases, it must reduce its total emissions of carbon
dioxide. If the U. S. is to reduce total carbon dioxide emissions, it must stop
the increase in carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants. While
carbon dioxide at 83.7 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions is the
most ubiquitous of the greenhouse gas emissions, Methane at 8.76 percent,
nitrous oxide at 5.32 percent, hydroflourocarbons at 1.92 percent,
perflourohydrocarbons at 1.00 percent, and sulfur hexafluoride at .14
percent comprise 16.24 percent or 1089 Tg CO2 Eq. of all greenhouse gas
emissions produced in the United States.12 The EPA reported that stationary
sources of greenhouse gas emissions produced 6.3 Tg CO2 Eq., or 1.0
percent, of CH4 emissions and 22.0 Tg CO2 Eq., or 6.0 percent, of nitrous
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oxide emissions in 2011.13 Coal-fired power plants contribute only a fraction
of the methane and nitrous oxide emissions produced by stationary sources.
Therefore, carbon dioxide emissions are the most compelling reason to
regulate coal-fired power plants for greenhouse gas emissions.

Control Methodology
The Clinton and Obama administrations were chosen for this study
because both administrations had proposed political agendas to reduce the
emissions of greenhouse gases. Each had similar political party support,
congressional control, and both entered office during an economic recovery.
According to the American Presidency Project (APP), in the 1992
presidential campaign, Clinton’s Democratic Party Platform stated that, “The
United States must become a leader, not an impediment, in the fight against
global warming.”14 In the 2008 presidential campaign, Obama’s Democratic
Party Platform declared that, “Global climate change is the planet’s greatest
threat and our response will determine the very future of life on this earth.”15
The research design for this study controls for political partisanship in that
President Clinton and President Obama are members of the Democratic
Party. Both the Clinton and the Obama administrations entered into their
first terms of office with Democratic majorities in the United States House of
Representatives and the United States Senate. From January 1993 to
January 1995, the Democratic Party enjoyed an advantage in the 103rd U.S.
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House of Representatives of 258 Democratic representatives to 176
Republicans representatives. In the 103rd United States Senate, the party
enjoyed a majority of 57 Democratic senators to 46 Republican senators.16
From January 2009 to January 2011, the Obama administration was
supported in the 111th House by a majority of 256 Democratic
representatives to 178 Republican representatives, and the Democrats led
the 111th Senate with 51 senators compared to 47 Republican senators.17 In
the 104th U. S. Congress, the Clinton administration lost support of
Democratic majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate,
and the Republicans retained these majorities in both houses of the 105th
and 106th Congresses of Clinton’s second term.18 The Obama
administration lost the support of a Democratic majority in the House of
Representatives of the 112th Congress, but he was supported by a
Democratic majority in the Senate.19 The Republicans retained a majority in
the 113th House of Representatives while Democrats controlled the 113th
Senate. 20
An examination of the Clinton administration will reveal that
little will existed among the people of the United States or the U. S.
Congress to make the economic sacrifices required to reduce manmade greenhouse gas emissions. It will show that at the beginning of
his first term, President Clinton proposed an energy tax to reduce the
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production of anthropogenic greenhouse gases that was later
defeated in Congress. Further attempts to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions were modest, voluntary, and not legislative. Thus, manmade greenhouse gas emissions increased over the eight years that
Clinton was in office. Therefore, Clinton’s minimal legislative efforts
to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions were
unsuccessful. Global warming theory and the dangers of man-made
greenhouse gases had been studied from the end of World War II
until the time President Clinton took office. Scientific research
organizations, funded by the United States government, publicized
these dangers at the national and international and levels. Hence,
the dangers were known to the general public. Why was there no
commitment by the American people, the Congress, and the Clinton
administration to reduce greenhouse gases from sources such as
coal-fired power plants? It seems that there are two major reasons
why the greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power plants
problem was not addressed in the 1990s.
First, despite Donald Crane’s claim that there was “virtual unanimity
among scientists”21 that man-made greenhouse gas emissions caused
global warming, no such unanimity of scientific opinion existed at that time.
There was a political consensus among many scientists in government
funded research programs that advanced global warming research in
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support of government environmental policy. However, reputable scientists
on both sides disputed most aspects of global warming science. The
government funding of global warming research politicized the science of
global warming. The government tended to fund research that supported
policy decisions. Thus, the science of anthropogenic global warming
became a political issue and the scientific consensus became one political
position among many.
Second, the dangers of coal-fired power plant emissions were known
since the late 1960s. It was also known that coal-fired power plants
produced enormous amounts of carbon dioxide. Provisions of the Clean Air
Act Amendment of 1970 were designed to reduce emissions from coal-fired
power plants and other large stationary sources. Yet, from the enactment of
the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1970 until the Clinton presidency, the use
of coal in power plants increased steadily. The Clean Air Act Amendment of
1970 provided for the regulation and reduction of dangerous emissions from
coal-fired power plants, but the emissions of air pollutants from stationary
sources was secondary to energy policy. The Clinton administration’s failure
to reduce such emissions was a continuance of the policies of the previous
twenty years. An examination of the development of anthropogenic global
warming theory and the use of coal in the latter part of the twentieth century
will illustrate that no consensus among scientists existed at the beginning of
the Clinton administration and that the reduction of coal emissions was
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secondary to national energy policy.
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CHAPTER TWO
A LEGISLATIVE APPROACH

The Clinton Administration
In his State of the Union Address on February 17, 1993 President
Clinton proposed a broad based tax that would tax the heat produced by
all forms of energy.22 Robert Paarlburg writes that:

Clinton had decided that Congress would never enact a pure carbon
tax because it would hit the coal producing and the coal using states,
especially in the Mid-West, too hard. Consequently, he decided to
propose a tax (based on British thermal units or Btus) on all forms of
energy production including nuclear power, hydroelectric power, and
even windmills, whether these industries produced greenhouse gases
or not. By placing surcharges on energy generated by fossil fuel
sources such as coal and petroleum, Clinton included some
environmental content to appease committed environmentalists.23

In an Earth Day speech on April 21, 1993 President Clinton committed the
United States to reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the
year 2000.24 In June of 1993, President Clinton’s Btu tax was killed in the
Senate Finance Committee by Democratic Senator David Boren of
Oklahoma.25 Eleven Democrats and nine Republicans served on the
committee.26 As all the Republicans on the committee opposed the Btu tax,
any Democrat on the committee had the power to stop the proposed tax.27
Senator Boren wanted the Btu Tax out because he wanted more spending
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cuts than tax increases; therefore, he used his position on the committee to
eliminate the tax from the budget.28 Even with a Democratic majority in both
houses of Congress, President Clinton’s first attempt at environmental
legislation failed, and his commitment to meet 1990 greenhouse gas
emissions levels was severely undermined. According to Paarlburg,
“Technically the modest reduction Clinton committed the country to would
have been easy to achieve had he managed to secure congressional support
for a broad based energy tax in 1993.”29 At this point President Clinton did
not move to increase regulatory control. When he released his Climate
Change Action Plan in October of 1993 he stated, “The package of mostly
voluntary initiatives aims to avert the threat of global warming through
‘American ingenuity’ … not more bureaucracy or regulation.”30 Some
reviewers of the plan indicated that its emphasis on flexibility and
cooperation, rather than control and mandates, attended to the economy
as much as the environment.31 The plan called for voluntary initiatives that
would reduce U.S. emissions by 109 million tons by the year 2000.32 The
plan would cost 1.9 billion dollars in government spending and 60 billion
dollars in voluntary spending from business and industry.33 It consisted of
three partnerships between government, business, and industry and was
designed to increase energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse emissions.
The Climate Challenge partnership was arranged between the Department
of Energy (DOE) and major electric utilities. Eighty investor owned utilities
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and hundreds of public utilities expressed an interest in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions.34 Climate Wise was an effort between the
DOE, the EPA, and industry that pledged to restrict emissions in cost
effective ways.35 The Motor Challenge was an agreement between the
DOE, motor-systems manufactures, industry motor users, and utilities to
install efficient motors in industrial applications.36 These voluntary
programs would apply to electric utilities to a greater or lesser degree and
would impact coal-fired power plants. However, by 1995, the political
community recognized that the Clinton administration was not going to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.
In March of 1995, Under Secretary of State Timothy Wirth announced
that the United States remained 30 percent short of reducing greenhouse
gas emissions to 1990 levels.37 Brad Knickerbocker quotes World Watch
Institute senior researcher, Hillary French, “Independent evaluations indicate
that most of the climate plans issued so far (by the U.S. and other nations)
will do relatively little to slow greenhouse gas emissions … This is because
they consist mainly of modest voluntary policies.”38 Others blamed Congress
as Knickerbocker suggests, writing that, “Shortly after he was elected,
President Clinton pushed for a special tax on carbon-based energy sources
like coal and oil in order to reduce their use. But congress nixed that idea,
and some lawmakers are pushing to cut federal programs for renewable
energy and climate research. The House cut NOAA’s climate change
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research budget by 40 percent.”39 In 1997, a draft appraisal by the National
Resources Defense Council asserted that the 189 MMTCE shortfall in
emissions reductions was due to a combination of a 40 percent reduction by
Congress of funds requested by the President, greater than expected
economic growth, and lower energy prices.40 President Clinton’s initial
attempt at a legislative reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by taxing
coal and oil failed. In 1994, ten out of eleven environmental bills failed to
pass.41 According to Los Angeles Times columnists William Eaton and
Michael Ross, the economy was the number one issue for the Democratic
majority of the 103rd Congress. There was no will in Congress or among the
American people to fund the reduction of greenhouse gases. As the Los
Angeles Times reported on the opening day of the 103rd Congress,
“Legislators plan to address a spectrum of issues that includes jobs, health
care, ethics and fetal tissue research. Topping the list, however, is the
economy— the issue a majority of voters identified as the most important as
they cast their votes two months ago.”42 The reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions took a subordinate position to the economy, and Congress was
cutting funding for environmental projects. The Clinton administration turned
to the voluntary programs that failed to meet the acknowledged goals of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. If there was “virtual unanimity among
scientists” that the anthropogenic release of greenhouse gases was causing
global warming and that global warming was a threat to mankind, why did a
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Democratic administration and a Democratic majority in Congress fail
to make the commitment to reduce man-made greenhouse gases?43
The failure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions during the Clinton
Administration likely resulted from a change in the relationship between
government and the scientific research community after World War II.
From the early 1950s, government funding was used to force the
development of scientific research into anthropogenic global warming. In
an effort to fill the information and technology gap about air pollution and
control technology, the government institutionalized the change between
government and the research community by appropriating vast sums of
money through the Clean Air Act and subsequent amendments. During
the development of its air pollution and anthropogenic global warming
control policies, the U.S. government adopted a policy of using the best
available scientific information and technology. It was at this point that
government policy changed from funding scientific research to provide
information on which to base environmental policy, to funding that would
provide the best available scientific information and technology to carry
out government environmental policy. For the most part, the use of best
available information was an inadequate foundation on which to base
policy. This created a situation in which scientist competed for government
funding based on their ability to provide research that supported current
policy.
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As the scientific community and government policymakers became
more closely linked, government policy and scientific research became
more politicized. The politicization of anthropogenic global warming science
resulted in a political consensus about global warming science and
government policy by government funded scientists. While a political
consensus existed among many scientists with regard to anthropogenic
global warming, many reputable scientists with valid objections contested
these theories. Because the government supported the political consensus
among scientists, the valid objections raised by other scientists were
ignored. Hence, the science of anthropogenic global warming became a
political issue rather than a scientific issue. By the beginning of the Clinton
administration this political issue divided policymakers, the American
people, and the scientific community. Thus, establishing the political
will to regulate CO2 from coal-fired power plants lacked support from both
the scientific and political communities. As a practical matter, there was
nothing new in the failure of the Clinton administration to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired electric utilities. From the height
of the environmental movement in 1970, to 1990, the effort to reduce
emissions of air pollutants from coal-fired power plants took a back seat to
the energy needs of the United States. The following sections will address
the politicization of anthropogenic global warming science and U.S. energy
policy that made the reduction of CO2 emissions from coal-fired power
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plants politically problematic during the Clinton administration.

Anthropogenic Global Warming Theory
The modern theory of global warming had its origins in the scientific
advances of scientific research during World War II. According to CorfeeMorlot et al.:

In large part, the advances came in the pursuit of military interest –
either in the use of weather modification as a strategic weapon of
geopolitical warfare or the need to understand the diffusion of
potentially destructive agents – e.g. chemicals and nuclear radiation
– in the atmosphere and marine environments. Likewise, scientific
advances in understanding the radiative properties of CO2 in the
atmosphere and the oceans role in the removal of atmospheric CO2
were developed by the military during World War II.44

The writers also note that in utilizing these wartime advances, “Three
scientists were notable in their efforts: Swiss scientist Hans Suess and two
American scientists Roger Revelle and Charles Keeling, with Revelle
becoming a main research entrepreneur out of Scripps Institute in La Jolla,
California.”45 The emergence of the contemporary theory began when
Hans Suess demonstrated that the oceans were acting as a vast sink for
atmospheric carbon dioxide and that the concentration of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere was increasing.46 In 1955, Dr. Suess joined with Dr. Roger
Revelle to show that the exchange of carbon dioxide between the
atmosphere and the ocean was limited, and this caused concern about the
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possibility of “never-before-seen amounts” of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere.47 In the late 1950s, Revelle hired Charles Keeling to measure
carbon dioxide concentrations in Antarctica and Mauna Loa, Hawaii.48
These measurements documented an increasing trend in atmospheric
carbon dioxide concentration, and they have been one of the major focal
points of the global warming debate since 1958.49 Theories that an
increased carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere was causing
climate change were rejuvenated in 1956 when Gilbert Plass published a
paper indicating that global mean temperature could increase by 1.1º C per
century. In 1959, he updated his calculations to 3º C per century, and
concluded that increasing the concentration of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere would absorb more infrared radiation causing the atmosphere to
warm.50 The newly developed science of anthropogenic global warming was
accompanied and supported by the new technology of computer science.
From its inception the science of global warming was linked with the
use of computers and climate modeling. Corfee-Morlot et al. state that,
“Research originally focused on war-time possibilities for weather
modification and John von Newman, at Geophysical Fluid Dynamics
Laboratory (GFDL) in Chicago was the main research entrepreneur in this
area.”51 With the development of computers in the 1950s and in the 1960s, a
community of scientists began to model the circulation of the atmosphere
which supported the theory of global warming.52 Allen Hammond reported
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that, “Numerical modeling of the weather has always been intimately
involved with electronic computers. Among the earliest applications of the
modern computer built at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study and
completed in the early 1950s—was the problem of weather prediction.”53
Although many problems existed with computer modeling, the success of
early numerical experiments led to an early linkage between computer
modeling and weather forecasting. Hammond explained that, “Despite the
use of a very simplified atmospheric model, these early attempts—John von
Neumann and Jule Charney—proved so successful that operational use of
the technique for weather forecasting began in early 1954.”54 Advances in
computer science cemented the link between global warming science and
climate modeling. Corfee-Morlot et al. explain that:

Atmospheric modeling was built upon the rapid increases in
computing power in this period, which increased several
thousand fold from the1950s into the mid-1970s. Emerging
‘general circulation modeling (GCM) tools provided initial results
relevant to climate change published in the mid-1960s. Although
the models ignored many important factors, the crude general
circulation modeling exercise corroborated Plass’ conclusion that
global warming would accompany human induced increases in
CO2; and by the end of the 1960s, this modeling community
had confirmed the usefulness of this tool for global warming
research.55

Government funding began to politicize anthropogenic global
warming theory as the contemporary theory was published in Suess’ and
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Revelle’s 1957 work. Corfee-Morlot et al. state that:

In a period dominated by policy for science the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO) was created in 1950. In 1957/1958 with the
leadership of Roger Revelle, the World Meteorological Organization
worked with other governmental organizations to support the
International Geophysical Year; this significantly boosted funding and
attention to climate change science, even prior to official recognition
of climate change as a political or social issue, within a broader
programme focused on meteorological issues.56

In the early 1960s, the theory of global warming continued to develop
as a science and a political issue. Corfee-Morlot et al. asserted that, “The
1960s ushered in a range of scientific results to confirm the greenhouse
effect or global warming theory as well as the beginning of broad-scale
interaction between scientific and policy communities on this
issue.”57 On the subject of anthropogenic g l o b a l warming, Sheldon
Ungar reported that, “In 1963 the Conservation Foundation sponsored a
meeting on the topic, while in 1965 a report of the President’s Science
Advisory Committee contained the first recognition in a government
document that human activities could produce climatic change.”58 Though
carbon dioxide was not considered a pollutant at the time, the Air Quality
Act of 1967 did recognize the problem by asserting the need for research
regarding carbon dioxide emissions. The Senate Committee on Public
Works held hearings on the Air Quality Act of 1967 and “the immediate
need’ to develop methods to control emissions of sulfur compounds, oxides
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of nitrogen, carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide.”59 The science of global
warming became more of a political concern for the international
community as the international role of the WMO expanded in 1967. CorfeeMorlot et al. declared that, “Shortly after, in 1967, the International Council
of Science (ICSU) and WMO created a collaborative international research
programme on global atmosphere, which included climate change along
with weather prediction.”60 The authors proclaimed, “Finally, governmentsponsored analysis of the science began to emerge, linking the rise in
CO2 and global warming to fossil fuel use and receiving separate attention
in government budgets.”61 Thus, by the end of the 1960s the politicization of
global warming science through government funding was pervasive, and the
empirical evidence and scientific conclusions of scientific research were
interpreted in terms of social and political objectives. As Corfee-Morlot et
al. stated, “From the end of the 1960s, the fundamental nature of the
scientific endeavor on climate change issues become more intertwined
with the public sphere. Agrawala explains this transition as a shift away from
policy for science to science for policy. In this transition, the science and
the politics of the issue become closely intertwined and affect one
another.”62 Government funding was not the only policy that was to have a
political effect on the environmental sciences.
In 1968, the Senate Committee on Public Works held hearings on
the 1967 Clean Air Act. In these hearings, a policy was put forward that
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appears to have created much of the scientific and political disagreement
that has surrounded the science of air pollution control and the science of
global warming. Prior to hearings in 1968, a Senate subcommittee
issued a report which proposed a solution to the problem of inadequate
scientific information and technology respecting the creation air pollution
control policy. Martin & Symington reported that, “A subcommittee staff report
on air quality criteria issued in July 1968 in advance of the hearings, while
anticipating this problem, also pointed out that regulation should not await
the development of adequate scientific data, but must proceed on the
best evidence available.”63 In July of 1968, the Subcommittee on Air and
Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works began a series
of hearings about expert testimony regarding the use of best evidence
available. The authors stated that, “The one certain thing established by the
expert testimony is that even the best available evidence may be totally
insufficient to form the basis for the kind of scientific conclusion on which
one would expect broad regulation in this field to rest.”64 While this
prehearing recommendation was eventually implemented, it was not without
its critics. The authors write of the above recommendation, “While that
conclusion is the subject of considerable dispute, since there are those
who believe that absent adequate scientific data, the effort may move in
erroneous directions, and while the issuance of the various criteria is
uncertain, undoubtedly some criteria will be issued in early 1969.”65 As
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the information of global warming science became more widely dispersed
many scientists began to evaluate the science of global warming.
In 1970 Helmut Landsberg asked the question, “How much has CO2
increased as a result of burning fossil fuels?"66 He responded to the
question by stating that, “It is quite difficult to ascertain even the mean
amount of CO2 in the surface layers of the atmosphere, especially near
vegetation. Various agriculturist have reported concentrations ranging from
210 to 500 parts per million.”67 Daily amplitudes of carbon dioxide
concentrations during growing season are about 70 parts per million.68
Thus, as Landsberg stated, “Nearly all early measurements were made in
environments where fluctuations took place. This, together with the lack of
precision of measurements, means our baseline—atmospheric CO2
concentrations prior to the spectacular rise in fossil fuel consumption of
this century—is very shaky.”69 The author advised that the ocean further
complicated the estimation of atmospheric CO2, writing that:

The oceans are a major sink for CO2. The equilibrium with
t h e bicarbonates dissolved in seawater determines the amount of
CO2 in the atmosphere. In t h e exchange between atmosphere and
ocean, the temperature of surface water enters as a factor. More
CO2 is absorbed at lower surface water temperatures than at higher
temperatures. I have already pointed out the fact that surface-water
temperatures fluctuate over long or short intervals; most of these ups
and downs are governed by wind conditions. The interchange of the
cold deep water and the warm surface water through downward
mixing and upwelling, in itself an exceedingly irregular process,
controls therefore, much of the CO2 exchange. … Hence, it is
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quite difficult to make long-range estimates of how much atmospheric
CO2 will disappear in the Oceanic sink.70

Landsberg also suggested that, “Even the remaining question of how
much the earth’s temperature will change with a sharp increase of the CO2
content of the atmosphere cannot be unambiguously answered.”71 This is
because, “The answer depends on other variables such as atmospheric
humidity and cloudiness.”72 According to Landsberg, a remaining difficulty
in determining CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere is that, “. . . our
estimates of CO2 production by natural causes, such as volcanic exhalations
and organic decay, are very inaccurate; hence the ratio of these natural
effects to anthropogenic effects remains to be established.73 Landsberg’s
article indicates that this lack of credible observational data will complicate
the development of computer generated atmospheric models, and the
expanding role of general circulation modeling in global warming research
for decades to come. Not only is the science of global warming questioned,
but so is the science of computer modeling of the climate.
Allen Hammond reported that, by 1971, the complexity of atmospheric
models used by the National Meteorological Center for the U. S. National
Weather Service, the Navy, and the Air Force had greatly increased,
but the most elaborate models were those developed at the Geophysical
Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL) in Princeton, New Jersey and the
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National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in Boulder, Colorado.74
Hammond noted the scale of the models, writing “The enormous scale of
these models is indicated by the time required to process them with the
current computers—from a few hours to most of a day, with the largest
models to calculate a 24-hour forecast.”75 Regardless of the increased
complexity of computational atmospheric models and their broad use by
meteorologists and climatologists, there were many problems involved with
their use. Hammond stated that, “The consensus among most
meteorologists seems to be that present research models provide some
information about the weather for at least five days in advance, but that
accurate long-range forecast for even this period are still not possible.”76 He
indicated that the limited ability of computer models to accurately forecast
the weather was due to factors in addition to the inadequate observational
data that Landsberg indicated. Hammond declared that it was unclear why
computer models did not more accurately forecast future weather patterns,
stating:

Nor is it clear whether the limiting factor is (i) the quantity and quality
of observational data needed as input to the model (ii) the
computational grid that is used (and that could be made still smaller
when faster computers are available) or (iii) the representation of
physical processes in the models. Numerical experiments are being
conducted to examine each of these possibilities, but meteorologists
agree that much more extensive observational data will be necessary
to adequately test the models. Meteorologists are planning a global
experiment with a target date of 1976 to obtain this data on a
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worldwide basis and to test the requirements for future international
observing networks as part of the Global Atmospheric Research
Program (GARP).77

Some of the problems with the collection of a sufficient amount of
credible observational data could only be solved through investment in
observational research and the development of a reliable database over
time. The problem of reducing the computational grid depended on the
steadily increasing capacity of computers to perform more calculations in
less time. However, the remaining problem was different. The problem of
accurately representing natural events in computational models was
inherent to numerical experimentation. Hammond explained the problem as
follows:

But a crucial feature in climatic simulation is the way in which the
various physical processes that control the addition of energy to the
atmosphere are modeled. Knowledge of these processes is still
incomplete—the research details of heat and moisture transport at
the air-sea interface, for example, are subject to ongoing research.
Other important climatic influences, such as the extent of ice and
snow cover at each pole, are poorly understood; for these reasons
meteorologists believe that it is not possible to do definitive numerical
experiments.78

The author indicated that the representation of natural physical processes in
computer

models was even more complicated when he asserted that,

“Smagarinsky believes that the development of still better atmospheric
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models for both weather prediction and climate simulation depends on
finding more accurate methods of representing the cumulative effects of
physical processes too small to include explicitly in the models;
‘progress’ as he put it,

means dealing more cleverly with small scale

processes.”79 Hammond informed his readers that, “In numerical
experiments designed to simulate the climatic conditions, models are
integrated until they reach equilibrium—a process that takes about a year
(on the simulated time scale) for models that include the stratosphere.”80
There was also an inherent problem with the integration of
computational climatic models, as Hammond indicated:

Meteorologists believe that the atmosphere is, in principle, a
deterministic system. But because of the nonlinear character of
atmospheric dynamics and the instabilities inherent in atmospheric
processes, small errors— whether introduced by observational
limitations or by finite difference approximations that are used in
numerical models—are known to grow as integration of the model
proceeds. Hence, the effects of even small errors will eventually
influence the large-scale features of any model atmosphere.81

The fact that the ocean and the atmosphere are so closely intertwined
presents a further problem with the integration of numerical models.
Hammond explained:

But owing to greater heat capacity and the resultant thermal inertia of
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the oceans, the oceanic model requires several hundred years to
come to equilibrium, compared with about 1 year for the atmospheric
model. The atmospheric model, on the other hand, is much more
complicated and requires approximately 40 times more computation
than does the oceanic model for an equivalent time step. And in the
experiments, the joint model did not attain equilibrium.82

Despite the quantity and complexity of the problems that limit the forecasting
ability of computational atmospheric models, Hammond asserted that they
have an advantage in that, “Observational experiments in the atmosphere
are costly and logistically complicated. By comparison numerical
experiments with computers are much easier to carry out.”83
The problems put forward by Helmut Landsberg and Allen Hammond
with regard to anthropogenic global warming and the use of computer
generated climate models were problems that persisted throughout the
rest of the 1970s, 1980s, and into the 1990s. With regard to general
circulation models, Hammond reported in 1974, “Other efforts are directed to
constructing general circulation models of the oceans—a problem that is
still far from resolution—which could then be coupled with the atmospheric
models.”84 Of other modeling problems, he stated that, “Still other
researchers have focused on finding better ways to model the effects of
phenomena, such as cumulus clouds, which are too small to appear
explicitly in a general circulation model.”85 In a 1976 article published by
the American Association for the Advancement of Science, a group of
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scientists (including J. E. Hansen whose congressional testimony in 1988
elevated the anthropogenic global warming issue to one of national urgency)
evaluated the state of computerized climate modeling. Its authors asserted
that, “Climate modeling is at a primitive stage and is not capable of
reproducing inter annual and long term climate variations.”86 According to
the authors, this “primary difficulty” arises because, “The processes,
involving the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere, and land surface, are
particularly complex because of the significant interactions and feedback
effects that occur among them over climatic time scales.”87 In the late 1970s,
J. T. Houghton expressed the concerns of many scientists about computer
modeling and the state of environmental research. He wrote in 1979,
“However, it must be pointed out that although these models include
many relevant physical processes, there are some very fundamental
feedback mechanisms … which are not included and for which there are, as
yet, no adequate means available for their inclusion.”88
The problems of anthropogenic global warming and climate modeling
science were complicated by other scientific revelations in the 1970s. In the
January/February edition of Environment, deforestation was added to the list
of problems affecting CO2 concentrations and climate change. The author
explained that the Director of the Eco-systems Center of the Marine
Biological Laboratory at Woods Hole, Dr. Woodwell, believed that
worldwide deforestation is contributing as much carbon dioxide to the
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atmosphere as the combustion of fossil fuels. If the oxidation of humus is
included, Dr. Woodwell believes that the carbon dioxide contribution of
deforestation is greater than that of fossil fuel combustion.89 The author
qualifies this statement by adding that, “The issue is not a clear cut one,
however, since the amount of CO2 accumulating in the atmosphere is,
according to Dr. Woodwell, substantially less than would be expected given
the amount released from the burning of fossil fuels and from the destruction
of forest and other elements of biomass.”90
Another issue that complicated global warming theory in the 1970s
was global cooling. Corfee-Morlot et al. write that, “Given the decline in
GMT from 1940 to 1970, some scientists believed a cooling effect of
particles was outweighing the warming effect of CO2 and there was on going
disagreement between cooling and warming advocates.”91 They explained
that, “Even as late as 1980, in part due to the cooling trend shown in
GMT data over the period 1940-1970, conventional wisdom as reported in
government science-based reports was that cooling would be as likely as
warming.92 As climate change research continued the theory of global
cooling gave way to the theory of global warming. The authors state that,
“The intense drive to understand past climate change eventually, led to
developments in the 1980s that began to dispel theories about global
cooling in favor of warming.”93 Regardless of this lack of agreement among
scientists, government funded groups continued to push for policies to
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counter global warming.
Research on the greenhouse effect and global warming continued
through the 1970s, and scientists and scientific organizations funded by the
United States government incorporated political agendas into their scientific
programs. In February of 1978, Science News reported that:

When in Washington, do as the politicians do. And, that’s just
what a good many scientist did last week when 5000 of them
gathered for the annual meeting of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science. Even though the theme of the meeting was
‘Science and Technology: New Tools, New Dimensions,’ many
of those present seemed more interested in arguing social-political
questions than presenting and listening to hard science.94

The author wrote of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science’s (AAAS) political agenda, stating, “As in previous years, the AAAS
showed its willingness to take a stand. This year the association stood
up for the Equal Rights Amendment.”95 The AAAS also released a twentyfive year forecast based on a consensus derived from a government study
introduced at the group’s annual meeting. Science News reported that,
“Few climatologists agree on the weather for the next six months, let alone
the next 25 years. But according to a study by the National Defense
University in Washington D.C., released at the AAAS meeting, the likelihood
of a catastrophic climate change is small. Most likely, the climate until the
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year 2000 will be very similar to that of the last 30 years, with more
possibility of global warming than cooling.96 Science News stated that:

William R. Gasser of the U.S. Department of Agriculture presented
the first part of the study that will attempt to quantify and estimate the
likelihood of various climatic changes, estimate their effect on crop
yields, and evaluate policy implications. ‘We’re not forecasting, but
putting quantitative bounds on climate,’ Gasser said, ‘It is a survey of
opinion to allow decisions to be made on the best judgments
available at the time.”97

The study was an international opinion survey of scientists from various
parts of the world. It was reported that:

The findings of the study, called ‘Climate Change to the Year
2000’ are based on a survey of 24 climatologist in seven countries.
From their answers to questions about perceived global temperature
changes, five climate scenarios, ranging from large cooling (0.3° to
1.2° C cooler than the early 1970s) to large warming (0.6° to 1.8°
warmer), were defined and assigned a probability of occurrence.
Depending on their perceptions of global temperature trends, each
respondent was associated with a particular climate scenario, such as
latitudinal distribution of temperature changes, length and variability
of the growing season, amount of precipitation and frequency of
droughts and monsoon failures, were drawn and assigned
probabilities.98

Gasser’s report on the study was ambiguous. While he reported that there
was no consensus on any issue, he explained that the warming effect of
carbon dioxide appears well established.99
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In the latter part of the 1970s other scientific research
organizations predicted the dire consequences that would result from human
activities that cause global warming. Lamb and Morth wrote of a statement
that was issued in response to concerns about Man’s effect on the climate
that said:

In 1976 the World Meteorological Organization issued a statement
that suggested that a drastic warming of world climates from this
cause (especially Man’s production of carbon dioxide) must be
expected to set in before the end of the century, and might already
have begun, leading ultimately to disappearance of the Arctic ice,
melting of ice caps, rise of sea level and great shifts in natural
vegetation and crop belts.100

Barrie Pittock reported that, “Within the United States, DOE has been the
lead agency in coordinating and financing a research program on the
greenhouse effect following a major scientific conference held at Miami
Beach, Florida, in 1977.”101 Despite the deficiencies of scientific data and
the inadequacies of computer generated climate models, Sheldon Ungar
declared that, “The issue reached a new stage in 1979: A report to the
Council on Environmental Quality cast the greenhouse effect as a policy
issue, the Department of Energy set up an interdisciplinary CO2 research
program, the National Academy of Sciences studied the problem, and the
first World Climate Conference urged all nations to address the threat.”102 In
1980, Dennis Hayes stated that, “A 1979 report by the National Academy
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of Sciences states: ‘We now have incontrovertible evidence that the
atmosphere is changing and we ourselves are contributing to that change
….”103
In 1980, Madden and Ramanathan wrote, “The inherent
variability of climate will make detection of changes due to increasing CO2
difficult.”104 They indicated that the reason for this problem was:

The observed interannual variability of temperature at 60° N has been
investigated. The results indicate that the surface warming due to
increased carbon dioxide which is predicted by three-dimensional
climate models should be detectable now. It is not, possibly because
the predicted warming is being delayed more than a decade by ocean
thermal inertia, or because there is a compensating cooling due to
other factors. Further consideration of the uncertainties in model
predictions and of likely delays introduced by ocean thermal inertia
extends the range of time for the detection of warming, if it occurs, to
the year 2000.105

James Hansen et al. wrote of the status of computer modeling in the 1980s,
stating, “Models do not accurately simulate many parts of the climate
system, especially the oceans, clouds, polar sea ice, and ice sheets.”106 The
writers asserted that, “The main uncertainties in the climate model—that is,
its tuning knobs—are (i) the equilibrium sensibility and (ii) the rate of heat
exchange with the ocean below the mixed layer.”107 Hansen et al. explained
that the way to correct the climate model is by adjusting the tuning knobs
(the equilibrium sensibility and the heat exchange with the ocean below the
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mixed layer) to agree with the observed temperature. They claimed that,
“The general correlation of radiative forcing with global temperatures
suggests that model uncertainties be constrained by requiring agreement
with the observed temperature trend.”108 It is difficult to understand how
forcing uncertain data to agree with observed data that may be
p r o b l e m a t i c (in a n u m e r i c a l s i m u l a t i o n b a s e d o n
s t a t i s t i c a l correlation rather than causality) can be predictive of real
world phenomenon.
A 1986 article in the periodical Environment Jill Jager stated
that, “observed increase in the concentration of atmospheric carbon
dioxide in the past century has been caused by carbon dioxide emissions
from fossil fuel combustion ….109 She wrote of the climate changes resulting
from increased greenhouse gas emissions, stating, “. . . since reliable
estimates of regional-scale climatic changes as a result of greenhouse gas
increases are presently unavailable, it is not possible to predict the direction,
magnitude, or rate of future change in ecosystems with a degree of
confidence sufficient for policy formation or strategy choice.”110 William
Nitze confirmed Jager’s statement when he asserted that, “There are many
uncertainties about the magnitude, timing, and regional distribution of future
climate change, but we do know that atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases are increasing.”111

Even with the uncertainties about

climate change, Nitze explained that, “To focus attention on these
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questions, in 1987, the U. S. government urged the governing bodies of
the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment
Programme to establish an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) to consider climate change at the policy level.”112 When the IPCC
met in November of 1988, a policy reminiscent of the U.S.’s 1968 Clean
Air Act policy was instituted. The author stated that:

In his remarks to the IPCC in November, Fred Berenthal, U. S.
Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, explained that a detailed and
complete scientific assessment of global climate change ‘will take
years perhaps decades, to develop.’ He went on to argue, however,
that the panel should begin to study potential response strategies
before the science assessment is completed. Some may argue that
no analysis of possible response strategies should be initiated until
we fully understand the dynamics of climate change, and we respect
that opinion,’ he concluded, ‘but prudence dictates that we begin now
to consider the practicality and potential effectiveness of various
response options.’113

Dale Jamison wrote that in that same year, “The emerging consensus about
climate change was brought home to the American public on June 23, 1988,
a sweltering day in Washington D. C., in the middle of a severe national
drought, when James Hansen testified to the U.S. Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources that it was 99% probable that global warming had
begun.”114 A number of scientists responded to Hansen’s congressional
testimony as Joel Scheraga indicated, writing, “Results of statistical test
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done by Andrew Solow of Woods Hole Oceanographic contradict Hansen’s
claim that an anthropogenically induced global warming trend has been
detected. And Tim P. Barnett, an oceanographer at Scripps Institution
of Oceanography, has stated, ‘The variability of climate from decade to
decade is monstrous. To say that we’ve seen the greenhouse signal is
ridiculous.”115 Eric Barron asserted that, “After studying the air and water
dynamics of the tropical Pacific, Kevin E. Trenberth and Grant W.
Branstator of the National Center for Atmospheric Research, in Boulder,
Colorado, and Phillip A. Arkin, of the National Ocean and Atmospheric
Administration blamed the weather of 1988 on ‘natural variations’ in
circulation patterns.”116 William Nitze explained of atmospheric CO2 that,
“We also know that such increases, in theory, lead to global and
worldwide changes in climate. However, we do not yet have a clear signal
of a warming trend because the variations we have observed so far could be
within the range of natural and historic variability.”117
In 1992, author S. Fred Singer wrote of a 1990 plan by the
International Panel on Climate Change to avert a temperature rise of 5° C
in the next century:

An Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), sponsored
by the United Nations, has been laying the groundwork for an
international convention aimed at averting such a climate
catastrophe. Its scientific base is a ‘Policymakers Summary’ on
greenhouse warming, released in June 1990, said to represent a
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‘scientific consensus.’ Far from it. The summary ignores valid
scientific objections to theoretical calculations that predict global
warming. It is silent about other human activities, notably the
emission of sulfur dioxide in industrial processes that are thought to
promote climate cooling. It plays fast and loose with historical data
that clearly disagree with the standard greenhouse warming theory. It
also puts a ‘spin’ on its major conclusions that can only serve to
mislead the nonscientific decision makers who are earnestly seeking
answers to global problems.118

Singer also asserted that, “The IPCC report is based on faith in existing
mathematical models that have not been able to ‘hind cast’ the temperature
changes experienced in the last century, and furthermore have been in a
state of flux.”119 He declared that the reason for this was that, “Many
scientists do not accept IPCC conclusions and call attention to the fact that
the strongest temperature increase occurred before the major rise in
greenhouse gas concentration.”120 Singer also asserted that, “Serious
discrepancies also exist between model results and actual experience from
the detailed climate record of the past century.”121
Just as the IPCC was releasing its “Policymakers Summary”
representing the scientific consensus on global warming, Christopher J.
Ecsedy and Charles G. Murphy published an article explaining that, “A
consensus that the causes of climate warming observed during the past
century remain unclear was reached at a session of the Intergovernmental
Committee on Climate Change Working Group I held in February 1990 in
Great Britain.”122 They further supported Singer’s assertions, writing:
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On the basis of computer models clear signs of the
greenhouse effect should have appeared as a consequence of
increases of greenhouse gases in the last 100 years. However,
model predictions were contradicted by the climate record in nearly
every important aspect, including that the Northern Hemisphere has
not warmed more than the Southern Hemisphere, high latitudes
have not warmed more than low latitudes, and the U. S. has not
shown a predicted warming trend.123

A consensus about global warming and the greenhouse effect did not truly
exist in the early 1990s. While the political consensus among scientists may
present a powerful argument for government policies to prevent
anthropogenic global warming, the contrary arguments suggests just as
powerfully that the United States and the international community were
forcing the use of inadequate scientific information to solve the problem.
Writer Sheldon Ungar stated of the political realities of the anthropogenic
global warming issue, “So much uncertainty surrounds the scientific
climatological facts that political inaction and counter claims suggesting
warming will be trivial enjoy plenty of scope.”124 The lack of scientific
consensus about global warming science and mathematical climate models
have created a political issue rather than scientific agreement about
solutions to global warming problems. Since the very beginnings of the
modern theories of global warming and the greenhouse effect, government
forced global warming research has politicized the issue and made
scientific research subject to political division rather than scientific
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cooperation. Thus, scientists became political activists for, or against, the
government’s global warming policy, and global warming theory became the
subject of political debate rather than of scientific agreement.
In order to reduce manmade emissions of CO2 in the United States,
the Clinton administration needed to get the electric utilities to reduce their
emissions of CO2. Though coal-fired power plants were recognized as a
major source of numerous air pollutants, compliance to the Clean Air Act
took a back seat to government energy policy. Thus, it would seem that the
production of energy, as a political issue, outweighed fears of environmental
disaster proposed by government funded scientific organizations.

Energy Policy and Coal-Fired Power Plants
As the U.S. Government established standards for the reduction of
sulfur oxides and other pollutants emitted from coal-fired electric utilities, it
continued to support the use of coal to generate electricity. According to
writer Harry Perry, the overall use of coal to meet the energy requirements
of the United States “. . . declined steadily until by 1972 it provided 17.3
percent, with oil and gas providing most of the balance.”125 Although the
Clean Air Act Amendment of 1970 had been instituted with provisions to
reduce emissions from stationary sources, they were not the primary focus
of the law. John Graham explained that, “The most prominent issues at the
time were emissions-control deadlines for the automobile industry and, to a
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lesser extent, new source performance standards for stationary sources of
air pollution.”126 Within two years of the enactment of the Clean Air Act
Amendment of 1970, the government opted to increase the use of coal to
produce electricity. This resulted from the increased prices of natural gas
and oil caused by the 1973 oil embargo initiated by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Perry explained that:

The quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-1974 and the fear of even
further sharp price rises (which actually occurred in 1979) raised
additional concerns about the long term implications of higher energy
cost. Thus, for both security and cost considerations, energy policymakers turned to the reserve of domestic coal, which could be
supplied at low cost, as a possible means of providing solutions to
those newly developed energy problems.”127

The increased use of coal to generate electricity was the major
change that resulted from the oil embargo. Perry claimed that, “There are
several reasons for this change. Government initiatives were designed to
increase coal use and price induced switching to coal occurred whenever
possible.”128 The Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act
(ESECA) of 1974 was just one of the initiatives used to increase the use of
coal to generate electricity. Author John Christie reported that in January of
1975, President Ford called for, “. . . amending the Clean Air Act and the
Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974 in order to
promote the increased use of domestic coal.”129 The ESECA also extended
the authority of the Federal Energy Administration to convert oil and gas
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fired power plants to coal.130 Gregory Elmes and Trevor Harris explained
that, “The National Coal Policy Act of 1978, the Power Plant and Industrial
Fuels Act of 1978, and the Energy Tax Act of 1978 increased coal’s share
in the energy market ….”131 Hans Landsberg informed his readers that the
Fuel Use Act of 1978 prohibited the construction of power plants and largescale industrial facilities that would burn oil and natural gas, and this Act
was not repealed until 1987.132 These policies encouraged the use of coal
to produce electricity, as Perry asserted, writing, “In the United States a
number of policy initiatives were undertaken to increase coal use and by
1982 coal’s share of the U.S. energy supply was 22.1 percent having risen
slightly from a low in 1972 of 17.3 percent.” 133 This modest increase in the
percentage of the energy supply was accompanied by an increase in the
overall energy supply of approximately 5000 quadrillion Btus during the
same time period; approximately 3000 quadrillion Btus of this increase was
from coal combustion.134
Policies that encouraged the use of coal were not the only problem
that affected the control of emissions from coal-fired power plants as Perry
asserted, stating, “The unanswered technical questions, the complexity of
chemical processes occurring after emission and before disposition, and the
lack of a good data base from which to assess reliably the magnitude of the
problem, including the health problem, have left considerable doubt about
the rationale of regulatory standards.”135 Inadequate science is not the only
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problem with controlling emissions as Perry wrote, explaining, “In addition to
uncertainties in the scientific information, the formulation of air pollution
regulations has been erratic and based on policy approaches that have not
solved the problem and have required frequent modification in time tables
established to achieve stated emission level.”136 Standards for the regulation
of carbon dioxide emissions were not established under the Clean Air Act
Amendment of 1970 or subsequent amendments. The major emphasis at
that time was the control of sulfur emissions and other pollutants. Writer
Harry Perry declared that, “In the direct combustion of coal, air pollution
standards must be met for sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and particulates.
Other pollutants are receiving attention, but standards do not yet exist.”137
Coal fired power plants were recognized as the major source of sulfur in the
atmosphere. Alan Schlottman wrote, “In the United States coal-fired power
plants generate the major portion of sulfur emissions, accounting for most, of
the 57 percent of emissions attributable to electric utilities.”138 While the
regulation of carbon dioxide did not come under the authority of the Clean
Air Act until 2009, many of the same problems that affected the regulation of
other pollutants would affect the regulation of carbon dioxide. Although the
need to reduce emissions from coal-fired power plants was apparent, the
use of coal to generate electricity continued to increase into the 1980s.
In 1979 the Iranian Revolution interrupted oil and gas supplies from
the Middle East, and the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island caused

41

public opinion in the United States to question the safety of nuclear power.
These events solidified the electric utilities choice of coal as the preferred
fuel for electricity generation. Scientist Bruce Allar stated:

In recent years coal has returned to the front burner as the future fuel
source considered most promising by the electric power industry. This
has happened for two reasons, first, the other fossil fuels traditionally
used in utility boilers---oil and natural gas---are less plentiful in the
United States and are therefore subject to the same vagaries of
foreign domination that led to the 1970s Arab oil embargo, second, in
the aftermath of Three Mile Island concern over the safety and
economics of nuclear power weakened the prospects that it will be
the principle source of energy in the coming decades.139

An economic recession in 1980 slowed the increase in electricity production
from 1979 to 1981; however, this strengthened coals position with respect
to its status as the chosen fuel for electricity generation.140 Perry wrote,
“Since electric power generation, which is heavily coal based, was less
effected than other fuel uses by the economic recession and conservation
effort, coals share of the market was less effected than other fuels.”141
Therefore, he explained, “Although electricity production grew an average of
only 1 percent between 1979 and 1981, coal use by the electric utility
industry grew by about 6 percent a year during that period” 142 According to
Hans Landsberg, coal’s share of the nation’s energy supply reached 23.5
percent in 1986 and, had “. . . virtually become a satellite of electric

42

power.”143 Authors Donald Strait and Richard Ayers wrote in 1987 that,
“Despite the 17-year history of the Clean Air Act, certain chemical
operations, oil refinery processes, and other important industrial sources of
smog-causing pollution remain unregulated in most states.”144 The
increased use of coal to generate electricity continued to the end of the
1980s and into the 1990s.
Writers Elmes and Harris asserted that, “In 1990, the electric utilityindustry accounted for 86 percent of domestic coal consumption while
industrial plants accounted for less the 14 percent.”145 From the passage of
the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1970 to the passage of the Clean Air Act
Amendment of 1990, electricity generation increased by approximately
1,368,000 million kilowatt hours or by approximately 89 percent.146 During
the same time period electricity generated from coal increased by 889,617
million kilowatt hours or by approximately 126 percent.147 Thus,
approximately 65 percent of the increase in net electrical generation from
1970 to 1990 was fueled by coal combustion. In 1970 the electric power
sector consumed 61 percent of the coal consumed in the United States.148 In
1990 it was responsible for the consumption of approximately 86.5 percent
of coal used in the United States. There were 462,400 thousand short tons
more coal consumed by the electric power sector in 1990 than in 1970.149
This was an increase of approximately 145 percent in the consumption of
coal by the electric power utilities over the twenty year period. The overall
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consumption of coal in the United States increased by 381,300 thousand
short tons. This was an approximate increase of 73 percent more coal
consumed by the United States in 1990 than in 1970. Thus, the consumption
of coal by the electric power companies accounted for 121 percent of the
total increase in coal consumption from 1970 to 1990. This indicates that
coal use by the electric power companies drove the increase coal
consumption, while other industries diminished their use of coal. The steady
increase of coal use from 1970 to 1990 represents a steady increase of
carbon dioxide emissions over that time period. If the Clinton Administration
was to meet its 1993 commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to
1990 levels, it would have to secure the reduction of CO2 emissions from the
electric utilities.
Although the groundwork for the reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions had been laid by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, the
regulation of carbon dioxide emissions was not yet under the authority of the
Clean Air Act. Donald Crane et al. explained that, “Other portions of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 address toxic emissions from coal-fired
plants and set the stage for considering CO2 emissions by initiating data
collection.”150 Therefore, at the beginning of the Clinton administration, no
provisions in the law existed to regulate CO2 emissions. Clinton’s legislative
attempt to control emissions of CO2 took the form of a tax on the production
of energy. Clinton’s energy tax was defeated in committee by a single
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Democratic senator aligned with a solidified Republican opposition that
favored spending cuts to increasing taxes. However, given the history of
energy use over the preceding twenty years and the fact that the economy
was the primary concern at the time, it is unlikely that the Btu tax would have
ever received the required support to become law. Clinton’s response to this
defeat was a somewhat lackluster attempt to persuade polluting industries to
voluntarily spend 60 billion dollars to reduce greenhouse gas emission. It
seems unlikely that the utility companies (who had been converting to coal
because it was the cheapest fuel available) would have voluntarily spent
billions of dollars to reduce emissions. Robert Paarlburg wrote of Clinton’s
Climate Change Action Plan that, “His official composite climate change
policy, the Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) produced in October, 1993,
did not revive the energy tax proposal and included no new international
negotiation initiatives. It did not even tighten corporate average fuel
economy standards for automobiles, despite Clinton’s earlier campaign
pledge to try to do so.”151 Despite the Democratic majorities, in both houses
of Congress, the 1994 Congress failed to pass ten out eleven environmental
initiatives. After 1994, Republican majorities controlled Congress throughout
the remainder of Clinton’s time in office. Rather than making the commitment
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, both Democratic and Republican
majorities in Congress preferred to nurture the economy. It seems obvious
that the scientific consensus about urgency of anthropogenic global warming
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failed to convince either Democrats or Republicans to act to reduce
greenhouse gases. Congress cut environmental programs and funding, and
the Clinton administration seemed to except the early defeat of its
environmental policies with little resolve to revive them.
According to the EPA’s Inventory of U. S. Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2011, CO2 emissions in 1992 totaled 4962.5
million metric tons. By the end of the Clinton’s second term, CO2 emissions
totaled 5,678.0 million metric tons, an increase of 715.5 million metric tons or
an approximate increase of 14 percent over President Clinton’s term. The
Clinton administration’s legislative approach to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions from coal-fired power plants was minimal and unsuccessful. It
demonstrated either a lack of commitment to address the problem or a lack
of understanding about how to address the problem. Although President
Clinton issued 364 executive orders during his time in office, he refused to
use bureaucracy and regulation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from
coal fired power plants. This indicates that President Clinton was not
convinced of the necessity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions during his
administration. Ronald Brunner and Robert Klein wrote of Clinton’s Action
Plan that, “First, the Action Plan is not expected to achieve its goal of
returning U. S. greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year
2000, or even coming close. It could turn out to be little more than a
symbolic substitute for effective action.”152
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CHAPTER THREE
THE EXECUTIVE APPROACH

The Obama Administration
President Obama pursued legislation to control greenhouse gas
emissions as both a Senator and as a President. Jonathan Adler recalled
that, “Specifically, then-Senator Obama called for reducing by 2050
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States by 80% through the
imposition of a cap and trade regime.”153 Cap and trade is a market-based
program that progressively limits emissions overtime. Allowances totaling the
limitation cap may be traded or purchased to enable businesses to meet
goals established under the cap. This provides an incentive and means for
polluters to bring their emissions within established limits.154 On May 5,
2009, Representative Henry Waxman introduced House Resolution 2454,
the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, which included the
President’s proposed cap and trade policy.155 On June 26, 2009, the House
of Representatives passed House Resolution 2454 by a 219 to 212 vote.
The Senate then received the bill on July 6, 2009.156 Prominent Senators
such as Barbara Boxer, John Kerry, Joe Lieberman, Lindsey Graham, and
others, began working on proposals for a Senate environmental bill. Yet,
House Resolution 2454 remained in the Senate until the summer of 2010.
Despite overwhelming Democratic majorities in both houses of the 111th
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Congress, H. R. 2454 barely passed in the House. The Senate never
brought the bill to a vote.157 Just as the Democratic majority in the 103rd
Senate did not deliver on President Clinton’s legislative agenda to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions with a Btu tax, the Democratic majority in the
111th Senate did not approve President Obama’s cap and trade proposal to
reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Like President Clinton, President Obama
faced a Republican controlled House of Representatives after the midterm
election. However, President Obama was not threatened with budget cuts to
his administrative departments and agencies. He was able to fund much of
his environmental program through the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009.
Unlike the Clinton administration, the Obama administration engaged
in an aggressive regulatory program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
from coal- burning power plants. These regulations make new coal-fired
power plants more expensive to construct and operate while existing plants
face expensive new standards. As one expert observed, “. . . the U.S
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA; Washington, D.C.) is moving to
regulate coal-fired power plants even more, not only with respect to
greenhouse gas, but also with respect to cooling water, and the disposal of
coal-combustion residuals.”158 Some projects to construct new coal fired
power plants and modernize older plants have been cancelled since
2008.159 New coal fired power plants, and older plants undergoing
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modifications are regulated under the Clean Air Act (CAA) as stationary
sources of greenhouse gas emissions. The regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions under the CAA came about as a result of a 1999 coalition
between a number of state governments and environmental interest groups.
They joined forces to petition the EPA to control greenhouse gas emissions
from motor vehicles under Section 202 of the CAA.160 In 2003, the EPA
denied the petition on the grounds that it lacked the authority to regulate
greenhouse gases as pollutants under the CAA.161 The EPA’s reasoning
was that the CAA was written to control more conventional pollutants such
as particulates and smog, not globally dispersed emissions such as carbon
dioxide.162 In the 2007 Supreme Court case, Massachusetts v. EPA, the
Court decided, in a five to four vote, that the EPA had the authority to
regulate greenhouse gas as pollutants under the CAA.163 Once the
Supreme Court decided that greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles
were pollutants, the CAA allowed for their regulation if the EPA
Administrator determined that these pollutants posed a danger to the
public.164
On December 15, 2009, the EPA made a formal finding that new
motor vehicles produced greenhouse gas emissions that caused or
contributed to air pollution that posed a danger to public health and
welfare.165 Once a finding of endangerment was made, the CAA requires
that standards to regulate such pollutants be established by the EPA.166
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Other provisions of the Act contain the same endangerment language.167
The determination that greenhouse gases were dangerous under Section
202 of the CAA triggered their regulation from new and modified stationary
sources under Section 111.168 Thus, the regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions from coal-fired power plants was recognized as a danger to
public health and welfare, and carbon dioxide was officially recognized
as a harmful pollutant. Another significant effect of the endangerment finding
was the CAA requirement for New Source Review and Title V permitting.169
The regulation of coal-fired powered plants and other stationary sources of
greenhouse gas pollutants is separated into technologically-based standards
and emissions-based standards. Technologically-based standards require
certain kinds of emission control technology, and emission-based standards
designate the maximum concentrations of pollutants in the atmosphere that
protect public health. These standards are provided under Sections 108 and
109 of the CAA and are known as the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS).170
Section 111 of the CAA is the primary provision for the technological
standards known as the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS).171
NSPS require that “new or modified” major sources of greenhouse gases
obtain permits that mandate technological standards.172 A source is
considered major if it emits 100 tons per year (tpy) or 250 tpy depending on
the source category.173 Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permits
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impose site-specific technology-based requirements that call for the caseby-case application of the best available control technology (BACT).174 Title
V permits are general operating permits where one can find all control
requirements such as PSD and BACT. They also contain monitoring and
reporting requirements, fee payments, and annual certification by a
responsible official. For the purposes of Title V, a “major” source is one that
emits 100 tpy.175 The CAA was designed to protect against pollutants that
are produced in smaller quantities than greenhouse gases like carbon
dioxide; which presents a problem for PSD and Title V permitting. According
to the EPA, if PSD and Title V permitting requirements are applicable
to major sources as defined by the CAA, many small sources of carbon
dioxide such as residential and commercial buildings will be unduly
burdened with the cost of site-specific PSD control technology requirements
and permit applications.176 For instance, processing one permit for a new or
modified individual source can require 300 man-hours for the agency to
process and can cost the facility obtaining the permit several hundred
thousand dollars.177 Issuing permits to residential and commercial buildings
is not as difficult but may require 60 man-hours. Requiring permits for small
sources of greenhouse gas emissions would increase PSD applications
from 280 a year to 40,000 and cost the permitting agency 250 million
dollars a year.178 Title V permitting at the 100 tpy threshold would increase
the applicable number of permits from 15,000 to 6,000,000 and require 340
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million hours to process, costing 15 billion dollars per year.179 Jonathan
Adler explains that:

According to the EPA, applying the Clean Air Act as written to
greenhouse gas emissions would extensively disrupt existing
regulatory programs, and perhaps make them impossible to
administer… In this specific case, however, the CAA’s text is explicit,
and the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA expressly rejected
the EPA’s claims that applying the Act to greenhouse gases would be
impossible or inadministrable.180
In order to avoid these regulatory problems, the EPA issued the
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule that established new thresholds for the permitting of stationary sources
of greenhouse gas emissions.181 This appears to put the EPA in the position
of violating the law it is tasked to enforce. Author Meredith Wilensky writes
that, “The EPA asserts that it has the authority to exercise the discretion
found in the Tailoring Rule based on statutory interpretation doctrine which
provides a highly differentiated standard of review for agency interpretations
of their governing statutes.”182 The first phase of the Tailoring Rule went into
effect on January 2, 2011. This phase stated that PSD and Title V permit
requirements apply only to sources already subject to permitting for nongreenhouse gas pollutants. These sources will need a PSD permit if they
emit or are capable of emitting 75,000 tpy of carbon dioxide equivalent. They
will require Title V permits regardless of emissions levels or related
requirements.183 The second phase of the Tailoring Rule went into effect on
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July 1, 2011. In this phase all new stationary sources with the capacity to
emit at least 100,000 tpy of carbon dioxide equivalent are subject to PSD
permitting as are phase one sources. In addition, all phase one sources
subject to permitting and the new sources capable of emitting at least
100,000 tpy of carbon dioxide equivalent are also subject to Title V
Permitting.184 Phase three of the Tailoring Rule went into effect in July 2013.
It did not extend permitting requirements to new stationary sources; it merely
retained phase one and two permitting requirements.185 All phases of the
Tailoring Rule apply to coal-fired power plants as they typically emit millions
of tons of carbon dioxide a year.
Under the Obama administration, the EPA is using provisions of the
Clean Air Act to tighten restrictions on coal-fired power plants. On January 1,
2012, Phase I of the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule began the SO2 and NOx
trading programs, and sources were to demonstrate compliance with the
rule by March 1, 2013.186 The trading programs set caps on the production
of SO2 and NOx to reduce the levels of these pollutants in adjoining states.
On May 1, 2012, the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule ozone NOx trading
program began, and sources must demonstrate compliance by December 1,
2012.187 Phase II of both programs will go into effect in 2014, and sources
are required to comply with the SO2 and NOx trading program by March 1,
2015 and the ozone NOx trading program by December 1, 2014.188 The
Mercury and Toxic Air Rule was finalized on February 16, 2012, and it
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directly targets toward coal-fired power plants, as they are the greatest
producers of toxic heavy metals released into the atmosphere.189 New
power plants will soon be subject to greenhouse gas standards established
by the EPA on April 24, 2013. As a result of its five year review of ozone
national ambient air quality standards, the EPA proposes to reduce that
standard from 75 parts per billion (ppb) to between 60 and 70 ppb. The EPA
also regulates coal-fired power plants under the Clean Water Act. However,
this aggressive regulation of coal-fired power plants does appear to be
reducing CO2 emissions from them.
From 2008 to 2012, the Obama administration reduced overall CO2
emissions by 560.0 million metric tons (MMT). Of this reduction, 473.7 MMT
were from fossil fuels and 447.2 MMT were from coal used in electric power
generation.190 Therefore, 80 percent of the total reduction in CO2 emissions
and 94 percent of the CO2 emissions reductions from fossil fuels resulted
from a decline in the use of coal to fuel electrical power generators. Electric
utilities reduced their consumption of coal from 1,042,335 thousand tons
(TT) in 2008 to 860,790 TT in 2013.191 This is a reduction of 181,545 TT, or
17.4 percent, over the five year period of the Obama administration. The
electric utilities net generation of electricity from coal went from 1,466,395
megawatt hours (MGH) in 2008 to 1,190,669 MGH in 2013.192 This is a
reduction of 275,726 MWH, or 18.8 percent, over the same five year period.
These reductions were accompanied by the retirement of 145 coal-fired
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power units from 2010 to 2012, with many more projected to be retired by
2016.193 This clearly demonstrates that President Obama’s executive
approach to reducing CO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants is much
more effective than was President Clinton’s legislative approach. Yet, the
Obama administration’s executive approach is problematic, despite its
success.
The effective execution of a regulatory agenda is dependent on the
ability and commitment of the executive. It is obvious that President Obama
has the ability and commitment to effectively regulate the reduction of CO2
from coal-fired power plants. It seems just as obvious that President Clinton
had the ability but not the commitment to drive his environmental agenda
forward. This points to a problem that is inherent in the use of executive
action by a U. S. President. The President of the United States is limited to
two four years terms in office. Once his term ends, a new executive takes his
place. Even if the new president has no objection to the previous executive’s
agenda, due to differing priorities he may not devote the time and resources
required to move that agenda forward. The Clinton administration’s effort to
reduce greenhouse gases is an example of an executive focused on
priorities other than the reduction of greenhouse gases from coal-fired power
plants. Ronald Brunner and Roberta Klein write, “. . . improvements in the
Action Plan have been obstructed by its relatively low priority. More
resources, including attention, have been invested in projecting aggregate
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emissions reductions, developing predictive understanding of global change
under the U. S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), and
negotiating a legally-binding international agreement under the Framework
Convention.”194 The problem of executive action is more evident if the new
Executive is opposed to the previous president’s political policies. Elmes and
Harris explain this, writing of the Reagan administration’s environmental
policy, that, “A second phase of government policy began during the 1980s
when a conservative Republican administration effectively disabled the
major regulatory agencies (EPA, DOE, DOC) and unleashed a period of
unrestrained laissez-faire economic policy.”195 Thus, any effective gains
toward the reduction of CO2 from coal-fired power plants may be undone by
the next executive. A well-crafted law, however, has the advantages of
longevity, of not being reversible by a single executive, and of keeping the
executive focused on enforcing regulations rather than researching,
promulgating, and implementing regulations.
An examination of the recent reduction of greenhouse gases, reveals
that much of the reduction in CO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants
resulted from a reduction in the use of coal rather than compliance with the
technological provisions of the Clean Air Act and its amendments. The CO2
emissions reductions from coal-fired power plants were achieved by
regulating the electric utilities to the point that it was more economically
viable to shut down older coal-fired plants and to cancel the construction of
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new power plants than to comply with the EPA regulations. As noted above,
the reduction in CO2 emissions from coal fired power plants was not an
actual reduction of CO2 in the emissions from coal-fired power plants; it was
a reduction in the amount of coal used to generate electricity. These
reductions resulted from the closure of over 145 coal-fired electric
generating units that have were forced out of the market by EPA
regulation and competition from natural gas. The Department of Energy
predicts that closures of coal-fired power plants will continue up to the year
2016.196
When President Obama leaves office, will the next executive keep this
economic pressure on the politically powerful coal and electric utility
industries? This depends on the new executive’s administrative priorities.
Emissions from coal-fired power plants increased from the time that the
CAAA of 1970 was passed until 2008. The reduction of emissions from coal
fired power plants were delayed by the energy needs of the 1970s and
1980s, by the politics of the Reagan administration, and by a lack of
commitment during the Clinton administration. The reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions became a political goal in the early 1990s and began in 2009.
Why, after over forty years of research, did it take twenty years to bring
about a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power
plants?
An examination of the Clean Air Act should provide some insight into
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the difficulties of reducing greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power
plants. This examination will show that the Clean Air Act was a new kind of
administrative law that rejected the state regulatory agencies of the New
Deal. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 did not insulate the EPA from
national politics, judicial intervention or interference from the legislature. It
will show that the Act was agency forcing, in that it established deadlines for
implementation of standards and for attaining those standards. The Act also
tried to force how those standards were to be achieved. It controlled the
States and the EPA Administrator in every aspect of the development,
approval, and implementation of air quality standards and State
Implementation Plans (SIP). The Clean Air Act was designed to place the
responsibility of the complex problem of controlling atmospheric pollution on
the EPA Administrator while controlling the executive’s actions. The law
forced technological solutions on stationary air pollution sources that were
not economically feasible for coal-fired power plants to adopt. It controlled
judicial review of the promulgation of air quality standards and the approval
of SIPs. Yet, the Act’s requirement to avoid technological and economic
considerations encouraged litigation by the electric utilities against the EPA.
This examination will show that Congressional intervention was the greatest
factor in preventing coal-fired power companies from complying with the
law. This study will begin with the early development of environmental law
and congressional trends in law making that began during the 1940s.
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The Clean Air Act
In the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, photo-chemical smog covered a
number of metropolitan areas and towns causing thousands of deaths. Doug
Haydel proclaimed that, “Smog is a killer. In October 1948 the town of
Donora, Pennsylvania was blanketed by heavy smog. When rain washed
the smog away, six thousand of the town’s fourteen thousand residents had
become ill, and eighteen eventually died. In December 1952, a deadly smog
struck London, causing four thousand deaths . . . and New York was
attacked by a killer smog in 1953.”197 These events caused the Democratic
majorities in the House of Representatives and Senate of the 84th U.S.
Congress to pass the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955.198 The bill was
signed by Republican President Dwight Eisenhower. This was the federal
government’s first legislative action to address the problem of air pollution.199
The law provided funds to study air pollution and research possible solutions
to the problem. Author Keith Castro writes that, “The first attempt at federal
legislation was the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955. It authorized the
Surgeon General of the United States to study the basic problem of air
pollution; to financially support research, training and demonstration
projects; and to provide technical assistance to state and local government
upon request.”200
In 1963, Democratic majorities in both houses of the 88th Congress
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presented the Clean Air Act to President Lyndon Johnson and it became
the first federal law to implement corrective action in order to solve the
problem of controlling air pollution.201 Castro declared that, “The federal role
was significantly enhanced in 1963 with the passage of the Clean Air Act,
which authorized the federal government to conduct additional research on
air pollution, to make grants to state air pollution control agencies, and to
intervene legally to abate interstate pollution.”202 The pollution control
policies of the 1963 Act failed to obtain favorable results, and members of
the public and the federal government pushed for reform. Jonathan Foster
explained that, “By 1967 many in the federal government realized that the
Clean Air Act of 1963 had failed. Air pollution continued unabated and
public sentiment in polluted areas shifted in favor of meaningful reform.”203
The Air Quality Act of 1967, enacted by a Democratic majority in the 90th
Congress and President Johnson, began to shape the future of
environmental law in the United States by expanding the federal
government’s regulatory approach to controlling air pollution. Castro wrote
that, “The 1967 Air Quality Act deviated from its predecessors by taking a
distinctly regulatory approach for the first time…. The Act required the
states to establish, adopt, and submit to HEW ‘ambient air quality
standards’ for ‘air quality control regions’ within those states…. And the
concept of state ambient air quality standards is the forerunner of the
present national ambient air quality standards.”204
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It is relevant to note a tendency in congressional law-making that
involved the extension of congressional power into the area of executive
responsibility, which accelerated in the 1940s and early 1950s. This
extension of power is accomplished by the use of statutes with provisions
that allowed Congress to perform or compel executive action, repeal
statutes, or to subject executive action to the approval or disapproval of
congressional committees.205 This was accomplished by congressional use
of concurrent resolutions.206 Robert Ginnane stated that, “In recent years
Congress has made a number of experiments in vesting certain
governmental powers in boards and commissions composed at least in part
of members of Congress, and in subjecting specified types of executive or
administrative action to the approval or disapproval of congressional
committees.”207 Ginnane cites twenty-eight acts passed by Congress from
1939 to 1953 that contain statutory provisions extending the administrative
control of Congress by the use of concurrent resolutions or committee
authorization of executive action.208 Twenty-seven of the acts were passed
in this fourteen year period by congresses with Democratic majorities in
both houses (except for a Republican majority in the Senate of the 80th
Congress) and with a Democratic president in office.209 This indicates that
these provisions were not motivated by party affiliation, but by institutional
affiliation. As environmental law developed in the 1950s and 1960s, so did
the congressional intrusion in to the executive responsibility. The Clean Air
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Act Amendments of 1970 reflect an extensive regulatory intrusion into the
administrative responsibilities of the executive branch of government.
This intrusion by Congress into the realm of executive administration
is in part a response to the expansion of executive power that came about
as a result of the New Deal. The New Deal had created regulatory agencies
based on what Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler call the New Deal
Ideal.210 The authors quoted James Landis about the advantages of the
New Deal agency, writing:

In the words of James Landis, the most thoughtful of the New Deal
theorist, those with experience in legislative matters … recognize
that it is easier to plot a way through a labyrinth of detail when it is
done in the comparative quiet of a[n agency] (sic) conference room
than when it is attempted amid the turmoil of a legislative chamber or
committee room. Rather than tying the agency’s hands with a host of
particular rules and detailed instructions, Congress should content
itself with the most general kind of policy guidance.211

According to the authors, the New Deal agency should be insulated from
national politics. They explained that, “By making the agency ‘independent’
from the executive, and endowing it with multiple commissioners, the New
Deal makes it difficult for a momentary national impulse to place its mark on
the course of agency policy.”212 Ackerman and Hassler also wrote, “But the
New Deal agency is not only to be insulated from national politics; it is also
to be insulated from judicial oversight. The overriding aim of administrative
law is to discourage the courts from displacing expert policy judgments by
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their own legalistic readings of the statute.”213 The most rigorous form of
insulation of the New Deal agency from national politics is cooperative
federalism. The authors asserted that, “An even more extreme form of
insulation is provided by ‘cooperative federalism.’ Here, the states, operating
under loose federal supervision, are asked to design a program responsive
to the peculiarities of local conditions.”214 It is the performance of
these New Deal agencies in the states that Congress was trying to move
beyond in the 1970 CAAA.
Environmental regulation, according to New Deal standards, was
rejected because of growing skepticism based on past experiences with
New Deal agencies. Ackerman and Hassler explained that, “When legal
activist tried to give their environmental hopes statutory expression in the
early seventies, their concrete experiences gave added point to the growing
suspicion of New Deal models among the American establishment.”215 This
experience came from state efforts to protect the environment. The authors
state that, “Before 1970, environmental protection was principally a matter
for the states, rather than the federal government; and when
environmentalist surveyed the state scene, the agencies they observed
seemed a parody of New Deal hopes.”216 Ackerman and Hassler wrote of
the new generation’s lack of confidence in the New Deal agency’s policymaking expertise, stating:
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They had relapsed instead into the old lawyer-ridden ways of caseby-case adjudication, laboring mightily through procedural labyrinths,
without successfully defining basic directions for future regulation.
Rather than becoming a home for dedicated experts, the independent
commission seemed a revolving door for lawyers hoping to gain
inside experience that could later be cashed out in lucrative private
practice. Rather than encouraging an impartial search for public
interest the collegial structure of the independent agency mired
would-be policymakers in collective indecision.217
These observations of New Deal agencies in the states hardened into a
more general criticism of the New Deal itself as the authors explained,
asserting, “These criticisms of agency performance merged, sometime
imperceptibly, into a more radical critique of the New Deal ideal itself. This
line of attack saw expertise as a myth concealing the inevitability of hard
value choices, political insulation as a screen concealing the capture of the
agency by special interest.”218
The experiences that Congress had with the implementation of the
Clean Air Act of 1963 and its amendment the Air Quality Act of 1967 led
Congress to amend the Clean Air Act again in 1970. However, Democratic
majorities in both houses of the 91st Congress had goals other than the
efficient regulation of air pollution.219 Ackerman and Hassler wrote of the
CAAA of 1970, that, “Statutes passed in the 1970s did more than commit
hundreds of billions of dollars to the cause of environmental protection in
the years ahead. They also represent part of a complex effort by which the
present generation is revising the system of administrative law inherited

64

from the New Deal.”220 At the height of the Environmental Movement
Congress acted to clean up the environment and to correct the
deficiencies of the New Deal agencies. The authors explained that, “When
Congress reacted to Earth Day, it set about to do more than clean the
water and purify the air; it also sought a new shape for the administrative
process—one that would avoid the use of ‘expertise’ as an excuse for
inaction and that would protect agencies from capture by special
interest.”221 Congress wanted the New Deal agencies to be efficient
regulators, but they were no longer willing refrain from correcting the
problems with ideal New Deal agencies. Ackerman and Hassler explained
that:

On the one hand, there was an increasing impatient demand that
the agencies finally redeem their New Deal promise by generating
clear standards through creative rule making. On the other hand,
there was a temptation to tinker with the institutional corollaries
associated with the New Deal Ideal. If existing agencies did not
redeem New Deal ideals, perhaps some creative legislature or
judicial responses would make a difference.222

In the 1970 CAAA, Congress attempted to correct the ideals of the New
Deal agencies in a number of ways.
When Congress established the Environmental Protection Agency in
1970, it began its efforts to correct what it saw as the problems with
regulatory agencies.223 Ackerman and Hassler asserted that, “Instead of
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permitting a group of ‘independent’ commissioners to run off indifferent
directions, the Act places primary responsibility on a single Administrator
squarely situated within the executive branch.”224 Thus, the EPA was not
insulated from national politics and was dependent on the executive branch
to administer the Clean Air Act. The act did not insulate the EPA from judicial
intervention as Samuel Bleicher indicated when he wrote, “Moreover in
presenting section 304, which provides for citizen suits against source
operators for violation of ‘an emission standard or limitation’ and against the
Administrator for ‘. . . failure to perform any act or duty … which is not
discretionary with the Administrator.” 225 While the CAAA of 1970 left the
major responsibility for the regulation of local environments in state hands,
the states were dominated by federal control. Edward Dunkelberger wrote
that, “EPA sought to provide guidance and direction to the states in its fairly
detailed regulations relating to ambient air quality standards, requirements
for preparation, adaptation, and submission of state implementations, and
conditions for approval of implementation plans by the EPA.”226
Dunkelberger explained the reason for EPA dominance of the state’s
environmental regulation, stating, “The plain fact is, however, that most state
agencies found that they did not have the necessary expertise to formulate
an implementation plan that would assure attainment of the primary and
secondary standards for each of six primary and secondary air quality
standards in each region of the state.”227 As noted above, Congress was
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aware of the deficiencies of state resources. Thus, EPA dominance over the
states was achieved by detailed regulation and the fact that states lacked
the resources to regulate the environment. It appears that the congressional
attempt to make New Deal agencies more efficient by correcting the
corollaries on which they were based was a mistake.
New Deal agencies were created based the corollaries of the New
Deal Ideal. These corollaries stipulated that experts in the uncontentious
atmosphere of an agency board room would find it easier to sift through the
vast amounts of scientific information. Hence, they would be more efficient
regulators of the environment than congress. However, this could only be
achieved if the agency was insulated from national politics. Thus, the agency
should be insulated from congressional intervention and independent of the
Executive branch. Judicial intervention was to be minimalized, and the
primary responsibility of rule-making was to be carried out by the states
under loose federal supervision. The problem with the New Deal Ideal is that
it was an ideal. New Deal agencies and the commissioners who ran them
were not accountable to Congress, the executive branch, or the courts. They
had closer ties to the interests of their local communities than they had to the
national interests that were attempting regulate environmental pollutants. As
thoughtful as James Landis was, it does not appear to have occurred to him
that many persons placed in positions of authority and power without
accountability will act in their own interest, especially, if one’s interest
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coincides with the interest of the rich and powerful in one’s local community.
When Congress placed the EPA under the Executive branch and legislated
judicial intervention, it promoted the political and legislative intervention that
limited the successful enforcement of the Clean Air Act. The new
administrative approach did not solve the regulatory problems that would
plagued the Clean Air Act. It merely departed from the ideal corollaries of a
failed administrative regime.
In order to prevent the bureaucratic inertia that that affected the New
Deal agencies, Congress used the CAAA to control the EPA Administrator.
It imposed deadlines for setting and meeting air quality standards and
specified how those standards were to be met. Writers Ackerman and
Hassler asserted that:

First, the Act requires the Administrator to set qualitative clean air
targets that would ‘protect the public’s health’ while allowing for an
‘adequate margin of safety’ and to reach targets by 1977 at the
latest. In taking this step, Congress forced the agency to specify its
ends more clearly than required by the new deal model. … At the
same time it energetically pursued this ends-forcing strategy.
Congress treated a second form of agency forcing in a more
ambivalent way. Once having set air quality targets, the next step
was to define the best means of achieving clean air targets by
1977.228

Setting air quality targets, compliance deadlines, and the means of reaching
such targets was highly problematic in the early days of the CAAA of 1970.
Scientific and technological information was not sufficiently adequate to
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perform these tasks. Martin and Symington reported that in Congressional
discussions of the Air Quality Act of 1967, congressional leaders stated their
awareness that this lack of knowledge would be a barrier to solving the
problems of air pollution and environmental control. The authors wrote that,
“The context of the legislation thus was one not only of urgent need but also,
as both Chairman Harley Staggers of the House Committee and Chairman
Muskie had pointed out, of recognition that here was no immediate panacea
to the nation’s air pollution problems, in large part because of the gap in
knowledge and technology.”229
Ackerman and Hassler believed that the control of emissions from
coal- fired electric utilities was a significant problem at the time and would
continue to be in the future. They explained that, their study, “. . . also
focuses upon a crucial substantive policy issue: the future of the coalburning power plant. At present, such plants contribute forty-eight percent of
all electric power produced in the United States. This share will grow over
the next half century. With oil scarce, nuclear risky, and hydro limited, the
nation’s rich and cheap coal reserves call for exploitation.”230 With the
enactment of the CAAA of 1970, the federal government exerted dominant
control over environmental regulation. The Act was also technology forcing
as Keith Castro wrote, “The 1970 Amendments reflect a full-fledged effort to
establish a comprehensive, technology-forcing, enforcement-oriented
regulatory scheme with strong sanctions and an overriding if not
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predominant federal presence.”231 Section 111 of the CAAA of 1970
authorizes the EPA Administrator to set New Source Performance
Standards for new or modified stationary sources such as coal-fired power
plants. It also calls for the EPA to base NSPS on the best system of
emissions reduction.232 It appears that Congress did not intend for the EPA
to consider the economic and technological feasibility of meeting the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) or NSPS. Samuel Bleicher
asserted that, “. . . the Act neither grants EPA the authority nor provides a
procedure to suspend implementation of the SIP or postpone required
attainments of NAAQS for economic or technological reasons.”233 This
statement was supported by a quote from the opening statement of a
Senate Committee report on stationary sources that said, “Therefore the
Committee determined that existing sources of pollutants either should meet
the standard of the law or be closed down, and in addition that new sources
should be controlled to the maximum extent possible to prevent atmospheric
emissions.”234 It appears that the EPA understood the intent of Congress
with regard to the regulation of coal-fired power plants.
Ackerman and Hassler wrote of the EPA’s approach to regulating
coal-fired power plants that, “It treated the power plant problem as if it
were an engineering exercise insulated from critical ecological and
economic issues.”235
In considering the best systems of emissions reduction for state air quality
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control regions, the EPA failed to consider many factors such as wind,
proximity to population, and stack height that effect regional air quality
standards. Instead, it focused on the technological aspects of controlling air
pollution. The authors asserted that, “Unless the EPA defined the ‘best
system of emissions reduction’ to take account of these complexities,
however, section 111 could read to authorize a narrow inquiry into the
technological design of the plant rather than a canvass of the ecological
stakes involved in new construction.”236 Because of the deficiencies in
scientific and technological knowledge, “Those methods of control that are
technologically and economically feasible today may not may not be
sufficiently effective to achieve the desired ambient air quality. Therefore,
where this is true, as technology advances, the states should prescribe new
requirements, on a continually more restrictive basis until a satisfactory
standard is achieved.”237 The EPA’s technological interpretation of section
111 and the lack of consideration of the technological and economic
feasibility in setting and meeting air quality standards forced the operators of
coal-fired power plants to invest large sums of money in pollution control
technologies that would have to be replaced or modified as scientific
information developed. The electric utility companies took these issues of
economic and technologic feasibility in meeting air quality standards to the
courts. Thus, judicial intervention into the regulation of the environment
began in a big way.
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Samuel Bleicher wrote that, “The time schedules established by the
Clean Air Act Amendments made intercircuit controversy almost
unavoidable. Since all SIPs were approved at the same time, the thirty-day
period for filing section 307 challenges produced simultaneous litigation on
similar if not identical issues in most of the courts of appeals.”238 The initial
result of this judicial intervention was that:

Four courts of appeals, under the tutelage of the electric utilities,
concluded that the Administrator must consider economic and
technological factors either at the SIP approval stage, at the
enforcement stage, or both. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court and five
other courts of appeals, at the urging of the National Resources
Defense Council (NRDC), announced rulings founded on the
proposition that achievement of NAAQS by the tree-year statutory
deadline is an unequivocal mandate of the Act that cannot be
avoided because of economic or technical feasibility.239

According to Bleicher, the result of this judicial intervention was that, “By
mid-1975, however, neither NAAQS nor compliance with SIP emissions
limitations have been achieved, and the most important stationary source
polluters, the electric utilities, had largely succeeded in avoiding even the
initiation of compliance programs.”240 This initial intervention of the courts
was unexpected because Congress had attempted to control judicial
intervention into the EPA Administrators actions with regard to setting
NAAQS and approving SIPs. One of the requirements of Section 307 (b) (1)
of the CAAA with regard to petitions that challenged the promulgation of
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NAAQS and the approval of SIPs was that, “Any such petition shall be filed
within 30 days from the date of such promulgation or approval, or after such
date if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such 30th
day.”241 Many electric utilities wanted to challenge NAAQS and SIP
approvals because they believed they were too restrictive. Dunkelberger
explained that, “More than one company or industry seeking to challenge a
state implementation plan designed to carry out primary and secondary
standards has concluded that a large part of its difficulty resided in the fact
that the standard in question was unduly restrictive.”242 However, most of
these companies failed to meet the requirements of Section 307 (b) (1)
because, “In most instances these objections to the standard itself were not
apparent at the time of promulgation of the standard, for it was by no means
clear how the standard would be implemented for particular industries and
sources.”243 It was at the approval stage of SIPs that the effected industries
and sources became aware of the consequences of the EPA’s standard.
Dunkelberger wrote that:

Only with the adaptation of an implementation plan, applicable to
particular industries and sources, did the effect of an unduly
restrictive standard become clear, but by that time judicial review was
no longer available. The provisions of Section 307 (b) (1) were
consistently upheld despite the numerous petitions filed against the
EPA approval of SIPs. The author states that, “The courts have
repeatedly emphasized that unless a petition for review is filed within
the 30-day period as specified in Section 307 (b) (1) there can be no
review of standards as promulgated, either in a subsequent suit
challenging an implementation plan provision, or in enforcement
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action seeking to carry out the provisions of an implementation
plan.244

Thus, as Dunkelberger commented, “At the early stage EPA promulgated
primary and secondary air quality standards for six major pollutants and in
each case the standard is final and no longer subject to review.”245
Therefore, Congress was able to control judicial review of the establishment
of NAAQS by the EPA Administrator. Congress instituted other provisions of
the CAAA that used judicial review to take away the agency’s discretion and
to force the EPA to act to regulate the environment.
Although Congress had attempted to control the initial instances of
judicial intervention, it mandated such intervention in two other sections of
the CAAA. The enforcement provisions of Section 113 of the CAAA provides
civil and criminal penalties for violations of the Act, but these penalties can
only be imposed on violators through federal lawsuits. Ronald Rosenburg
noted that, “Environmental law authorizes a range of enforcement
techniques that impose both civil remedies—injunctive and financial—and
criminal penalties. However, both of these enforcement methods require a
federal enforcement lawsuit.”246 While there is nothing unusual in court
action to proscribe penalties for violations of the law, this speaks to the great
expense that numerous of federal lawsuits incur. This expense is greatly
increased by one of the most agency forcing sections of the CAAA. Section
304, authorizes citizen lawsuits to force the EPA Administrator to act in
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areas where he has no discretion. In instances where the EPA Administrator
is required to act, he only has the discretion to set the priorities for actions to
be taken. Section 304 expands judicial intervention and effectively allows
citizens to set the priorities for administrative action.
During the 1980s, the Reagan administration’s laissez faire
economic policies effectively disabled regulatory agencies such as the
EPA, but many lawsuits were initiated to force the agency to act. Donald
Strait and Richard Ayers wrote that, “While the EPA flounders the
National Resources Defense Council, the American Lung Association,
and other public health, and environmental organizations are turning to
the courts to enforce the Clean Air Act.”247 Many of these lawsuit were
directed toward a particular end with regard to the EPA Administrator’s
enforcement of the law. Strait and Ayers wrote that, “Lawsuits have been
filed in New York and New Jersey to require that significant ozone
reduction strategies be carried out.”248 The authors also noted that
judicial intervention with regard to ozone reduction was being initiated in
Massachusetts, Philadelphia, Chicago, and other places.249 The limited
success of these lawsuits in reducing ozone emissions and the sometime
debilitating results of court decisions (as in the 2007 Massachusetts v.
EPA) make the expense of this agency forcing strategy questionable.
The lack of political insulation from the executive control and from judicial
intervention was not as detrimental to the enforcement of the CAAA as
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congressional intervention.
The original Clean Air Act was passed in 1963 and the first
Congressional intervention was its amendment by the Air Quality Act of
1967. Author Keith Castro explained that, “The 1967 Air Quality Act
deviated from its predecessors by taking a distinctly regulatory approach
for the first time. The Act required the states to establish, adopt, and submit
to HEW ‘ambient air quality standards’ for air quality control regions within
those states.”250 The second Congressional intervention into the Clean Air
Act were the previously discussed amendments of 1970. The 1977 Clean
Air Act Amendments were primarily concerned with maintaining NAAQS in
geographical regions in which the standard had been met, and it placed
new requirements on sources in regions that had not met NAAQS.251
Prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) provisions placed permit
requirements on new or modified stationary sources that required that
best available control technology (BACT) to be used in air control regions
that had attained NAAQS; it placed BACT requirements on new and
modified stationary sources in air quality regions that had not attained
NAAQS.252 The amendments of 1977 suspended compliance to NAAQS
for up eight months in a national or regional energy emergency that
resulted from a shortage of energy supplies or high levels of
unemployment. (NIH 2014) 253 The 1977 amendments extended the
operation of any stationary source that did not comply with NAAQS if an
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economic emergency arose as a result of unemployment caused by the
closure. The last direct Congressional intervention into Clean Air Act
occurred with the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The 1990
amendments expanded judicial intervention by providing monetary
awards for citizen cases brought against pollution sources and the EPA. It
granted new enforcement powers to the EPA by allowing it to issue
penalty orders up to $200,000.00 and citations up to $5,000.00 for lesser
violations. It also increased penalties for both civil and criminal violations
of the Act. Thus, under the CAAA of 1977 and 1990 Congress expanded
the technology and agency forcing provisions of the Clean Air Act, and it
gave the EPA the power to penalize violators of the regulations that it
promulgates.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Conclusions
Which approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions from coalfired power plants is the most effective, the legislative approach of the
Clinton administration or the executive approach of the Obama
administration? The short answer to this question is that the Obama
administration has been more effective in reducing the emission greenhouse
gases from coal-fired power plants. Yet, it appears that the efficiency of the
Obama administration in reducing greenhouse gases from coal fired power
plants may have more to do with the commitment of the executive, rather
than the approach taken. Under the Constitution of the United States, both
the legislative and executive approaches are required to carry out the law.
The Congress enacts law through the legislative power granted solely to it
by the Constitution. The Executive may propose law and veto law, but it is
not empowered to make law. While Congress may enact law, it requires the
Executive power to enforce it.
President Clinton’s attempt to reduce greenhouse gas emissions was
not supported by the provisions of the Clean Air Act. Thus, any executive
action to reduce greenhouse gases would have been unconstitutional.
President Clinton’s primary response was to propose an energy tax that
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would have reduced the use of fossil fuels from all sources. When Congress
failed to pass his energy tax, President Clinton pursued a modest voluntary
plan to reduce greenhouse emissions from industrial sources of greenhouse
gases. In the remaining seven years of his presidency, he showed little or no
interest in reviving his legislative approach to control greenhouse gases.
When President Obama came to office, he proposed a cap and trade bill to
reduce carbon emissions. When Congress failed to pass his proposal, he
was able to pursue the reduction of greenhouse gases by executive
regulation. This was because the Supreme Court had expanded the
authority of the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Thus,
President Obama has been able to use his executive power to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act. However, the Clean Air
Act has proven to be very difficult to enforce and is subject to the political
views of the Executive.
The reason that President Obama has succeeded in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power plants is that he is
personally committed to this goal. President Clinton could have reduced
greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power plants in the same way as
President Obama, promulgating rules and regulations to reduce SO2, NOx,
and other pollutants that would have forced the closure of older coal-fired
power plants and prevented the construction of newer plants. This would
have also reduced greenhouse gas emissions. Clinton’s priority was the
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maintenance of the economy, not the reduction of greenhouse gases from
coal-fired power plants. President Clinton does not appear to have opposed
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, he simply placed a higher priority on
maintaining the economy. As effective as President Obama’s administration
is in reducing CO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants, President
Reagan’s administration was just as effective in disabling the regulatory
abilities of the EPA. Thus, the regulation of the environment and the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions seems to depend more on the
Executive’s commitment, rather than the CAAA’s provisions.
This developed because Congress attempted to write the detailed
provisions of the CAAA in a way that controlled the environment through
executive action, while controlling the Executive at the same time. As a
result, environmental law became a political issue between Congress and
the Executive branch. Another result of placing the EPA under the Executive
branch was that environmental science and the science of anthropogenic
global warming became political issues rather than scientific solutions. The
Department of Energy funded early global warming research. However, it
was subject to the same science for policy influences as the EPA. The
rejection of the New Deal Ideal by Congress in the early 1970s was not
accompanied by an effort to salvage what worked in the New Deal agencies;
it was accomplished by a reversal of the corollaries that were supposed to
make New Deal agencies superior regulators.
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Congress placed the EPA under control of the Executive branch and
at the same time intruded into the executive’s responsibility to enforce the
law. This made environmental law subject to the political views of the
President and opposing political forces in Congress. Congress left the
responsibility of the environmental control of air pollution to the states, but
placed the states under the detailed regulation of the EPA. This made
CAAA’s enforcement a political issue between the states and the federal
government and between local and national interests. In effect, Congress
removed the advantages of political insulation through state control by
submitting that control to close federal supervision. It also retained the
disadvantages of state control by subjecting environmental regulation to the
influence of local interests. Congress encouraged judicial intervention
through inflexible policies with regard to the economic and technological
feasibility of meeting air quality standards. It also encouraged the courts to
intervene through Section 304 and the enforcement provisions of the act.
This caused delays in the implementation of environmental programs as the
courts sorted through the complex legalities of the act. This greatly
increased the expense of implementing and enforcing the Clean Air Act. In
some cases, the court interpreted the CAAA in ways that were contrary to
the intent of those who framed the law. It also hampered the EPA
Administrator by allowing the courts to set implementation and enforcement
priorities favored by special interest groups rather than the Administrator.
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Thus, the CAAA, as enacted by Congress, created political division between
all the component organizations responsible for controlling air pollution.
When Congress placed the EPA under the control of the Executive
branch, it transferred the responsibility of cleaning up the environment to the
Executive. Its goal was to control the agency and its administrator in a way
that would solve the problem of “bureaucratic inertia” through the detailed
requirements of the act.254 Congress made the EPA responsible for setting
air quality standards, approving state implementation plans, and conducting
enormous research programs to fill the scientific and technological
information gap. This transfer of responsibility to control environmental air
pollution was accompanied by a transfer of legislative authority to the
Executive branch of government. The Executive branch was no longer
responsible for merely enforcing the law. Congress delegated to the
Executive the legislative responsibility to set standards, to enforce them, and
later, to penalize their violation. Hence, Congress complemented the
enforcement power of the Executive branch with the legislative and judicial
power to set the standards of the law and to adjudicate and punish the
violators. It is little wonder that the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions
from coal-fired power plants has come to depend on the political agenda of
the Executive. Just as President Obama has set the standards and enforced
them on the coal industry and the electric utilities, President Reagan refused
to set the standards or to enforce the regulations of the Clean Air Act. In
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each case, the political opponents of the President were unable change the
political agenda of the Executive. Even the Democratic majorities in both
houses of Congress during the Reagan administration’s two terms were
unable to affect a change in his political agenda.255 By assigning the
responsibility of scientific and technical research to the Executive branch,
Congress made the Executive more independent and the science more
political.
The development of scientific research to set air quality standards and
develop technical solutions to air pollution was relegated to the Executive
branch of government by the Congress. Congress also pushed the direction
of this research by the agency-forcing and technology-forcing provisions of
the CAAA. The act forced the EPA to set air quality standards based on
inadequate scientific information. Under Section 111, it forced technological
solutions to emission controls for new stationary sources. Once the EPA set
air quality standards and committed to particular technical solutions for
controlling emissions from stationary sources, it was committed to a
particular policy of pollution control. It became necessary for the EPA to
promote scientific findings that supported the policies to which it was
committed. Thus, the vast amounts of money devoted to scientific research
were directed toward the scientific programs that supported the EPA’s
regulatory agenda. Congress relinquished much of its ability to oversee the
environmental program because it depended on the EPA and the Executive
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branch research programs for its policy information. Thus, the amendments
that Congress subsequently passed continued to expand the agency and
technology-forcing provisions already in place. Those in the scientific
community who disputed the science that supported the EPA were not
recognized as having valid scientific objections. Because environmental
research, including global warming research, had political goals rather than
merely scientific objectives, those persons who were politically opposed to
environmental policy based their objections on the opposing scientific
views. Hence, the science of air pollution control and global warming from
man-made greenhouse gas emissions became political rhetoric for or
against the government’s environmental policy. The fact that Congress left
responsibility for air pollution control in the states created other problems
for the control of emissions from coal-fired power plants.
In 1987, Donald Strait and Richard Ayers wrote that, “Despite the 17year history of the Clean Air Act, certain chemical operations, oil refinery
processes, and other important industrial sources of smog causing pollution
remain unregulated in most states. Somehow, EPA has avoided formally
evaluating what kinds of controls are practiced for those sources, and this
bureaucratic inertia has become an excuse for states to avoid clamping
down on local interest.”256 This assessment of EPA and state performance in
the regulation of stationary sources seems accurate. In 1987, Ronald
Reagan was in the third year of his second term, and the EPA and other
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regulatory agencies were inactive under the laissez faire economics of the
Reagan administration. The states were free of federal control just as they
were under the New Deal state agencies of the late 1960s. State and local
interests were aligned with the economic interest of the administration.
Hence, many stationary sources of carbon dioxide, such as coal- fired power
plants, were allowed to operate with minimal control. This was not a new
situation because from 1973 to the late 1980s, the local interests of coalfired power plants aligned with national energy policy. During these years,
the Congress and the presidential administrations of Gerald Ford and Jimmy
Carter called for power plants to convert to coal. Congress and both
presidents called for and passed legislation to exempt coal-fired power
plants from compliance to environmental laws and to convert from less
polluting fuels to coal. Thus, the electric utilities were able to resist
compliance to environmental legislation. This antagonized environmentalist
and led to greater political division between supporters and opponents of
environmental regulation. The problems caused by not insulating the EPA
from the Executive and leaving responsibility of air pollution control to the
states under tight federal control were exacerbated by the act’s
encouragement of judicial intervention.
The inflexibility of the policy that would not allow consideration of
the economic and technological feasibility of the application of the
technological solutions under Section 111 of the CAAA caused numerous

85

lawsuits between pollution sources and the EPA. These lawsuits caused
delays in the setting of standards and the implementation of control
policies while the issues were resolved by the courts. However, the
continuous litigation caused by Section 304 of the CAAA resulted in
untold expense. It has also pushed the agency into regulating
greenhouse gas emissions under a law that was designed to regulate
pollutants which are produced in smaller quantities than greenhouse
gases. In the 2007 Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the
Court declared that the EPA could regulate greenhouse gases under the
CAAA. In 2009, when EPA Administrator found that greenhouse gases
from automobiles were air pollutants that posed a threat to public health
and welfare, the agency-forcing provisions of the CAAA required that
coal-fired power plants be regulated to reduce the emission of CO2.
Because the quantities of emissions required for PSD and Title V
permitting were designed for pollutants that were emitted at much lower
rates, the regulation of greenhouse gases under the CAAA required
new thresholds for major stationary sources. If greenhouse gases were
regulated under the old thresholds, it would greatly increase the number of
sources requiring PSD and Title V permitting. This would create onerous
financial burdens for these smaller sources and an administrative nightmare
for the EPA. The EPA could not avoid this problem because the decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA specifically rejected the idea that greenhouse gases

86

were not administrable under the CAAA. Thus, the EPA reinterpreted the
law and established new thresholds for major sources of greenhouse gases.
This judicial intervention by the Supreme Court has weakened a seriously
flawed law and is detrimental to the rule of law in general.
The reduction of greenhouse gases depends on the President’s
intent. This is because Congress has ceded legislative power to the
President to finish writing the law by establishing air quality standards. This
weakens the law because the scope of any president’s actions under the
CAAA is limited by his time in office. Hence, whatever environmental gains
are achieved under a particular president may be, but often are not,
maintained by the new Executive. Thus, while executive action is effective,
decisive, and flexible; it lacks longevity. If a president or an EPA
administrator under the direction of a president can change the
requirements of the law, the law itself becomes subject not only to national
politics, but to the President’s preferences. The advantage of law is that it is
an established guideline that will last until it is repealed by the Congress.
Those that are subject to the law know what the law is and what they must
do to obey it. However, if the executive is allowed to change those
guidelines without authorization from Congress, those subject to the law will
not know whether their future actions will be within the law. It is not
economically feasible for a power plant to invest in scrubbers and carbon
capture equipment if they cannot depend on the standards and
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requirements of the law to remain the same. A person would not buy a
home if he thought that the executive of the bank could change the interest
rates or the payment schedule to suit his particular ends. Thus, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA weakened the law by
placing the executive in a position in which he either changed the law or he
enforced the law under the absurd consequences that resulted from the
Court’s decision.
The CAAA is a poorly designed law. For the first twenty years of its
existence, Congress and a number of presidents were committed to energy
policy rather than environmental policy. The experts at the EPA have shown
little imagination or creativity in solving the problems of air pollution. They
have pushed the use of scrubbers for over forty years. President Reagan
opposed environmental regulation and President Clinton ignored it.
President Obama has produced some reductions in the emission of
greenhouse gases from coal-fired power plants. However, it is uncertain
how much of these reductions have resulted from his environmental policy
and how much have resulted from the slow economy and competition from
natural gas to fuel electric utilities. In over fifty years of global warming
research, the science does not appear to have convinced politicians or the
American people that the threat of anthropogenic global warming requires
an all-out commitment to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired
power plants. The pervasiveness of the uncertainties in all aspects of global
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warming science and air pollution control does not convince one that current
scientific knowledge is adequate for the formulation of government policy to
control the environment. The much vaunted scientific consensus with regard
man-made global warming and government environmental policy, is not
convincing. This is not to deny that climate change is real or that outlandish
amounts of CO2 are being pumped into the atmosphere. However, the
inadequacies of observational data and the computer models on which we
base environmental policy may do more harm than good. Computer
generated climate models have many problems and most of global warming
science has been based on them since the 1950s.
Many, if not most, of these models are based on correlations resulting
from incidents of past climate warming. These correlations are estimated
from concentrations of different isotopes of oxygen formed in the ocean
during warming and cooling periods. These are compared to CO2
concentrations in Arctic and Antarctic ice-core samples. The resulting
correlations are used as the basis for many computer generated climate
models. Global warming theory indicates that CO2 concentrations are
responsible for the rise in global temperatures. However, author Roy
Spencer writes that, “First, most if not all of the studies of those ice-core
based relationships between temperature and CO2 suggests that
temperature changes preceded CO2 changes by at least several hundred
years. This indicates the possibility that temperature changes caused carbon
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dioxide changes, rather than the other way around as is the claim of global
warming.”257 Correlations are not evidence; they do not speak to causality. In
other words, just because temperatures rise does not mean that it is causing
a rise CO2 concentration as well. Both could rise as the result of a third
factor or a combination of other factors. Again, this is not to deny the
possibility of man-made climate change, but there are valid reasons to be
skeptical of the cause and the effect of climate change. Although there are
possible solutions to correct some of the problems associated with the
CAAA, the possibility and practicality of making such changes is doubtful. If
the law could be reenacted, it might be constructed in the following way.
First, the law would be repealed and rewritten. Congress would take
the responsibility for setting the environmental standards of the new law.
Hence, any change in the standards or the requirements of the law would be
corrected by the appropriate legal authority. Congress would also take
responsibility for the scientific and technological research. It would form
commissions that represent both the scientific community and industries to
be regulated. This would provide expert information from a combination of
the applied knowledge of industry experts and the more theoretical scientific
knowledge of scientists. These commissions would report their findings
directly to Congress, and Congress would then use the information to
establish standards and formulate solutions for pollution control. This would
depoliticize the science and produce solutions that would be more
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acceptable to the power industry. The political issues would be worked out in
Congress by the representatives of the nation’s interests. The EPA would
remain under the Executive branch, but the only duty that it would perform
would be the enforcement of the environmental standards provided by the
law. It would not set standards, conduct research, or adjudicate and punish
violators of the law. The EPA would confine its duties to citing violators and
providing evidence of wrongdoing to the Justice Department. The EPA
Administrator would be free to organize the enforcement regime of the
agency as he or she thinks is most appropriate. This would maintain the
separation of powers between the Executive and Congress and reduce
political tensions between these two branches of government. If local
interests are represented in the legislative process and the sole
responsibility of the EPA is to enforce the law, states could then focus on
their local environmental programs and help local interests in meeting the
environmental standards of the federal law. This would reduce political
tension between the state and federal governments and between local and
national interests. Finally, the law would neither encourage nor try to restrict
judicial intervention. There would be no need for agency-forcing provisions
or to protect the law from judicial intervention. If the Court intervenes and
makes a finding that affects the application of the law, Congress has the
authority and the means to correct it as it sees fit. The subject of
environmental law is complicated and controversial in many ways. This
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study has barely scratched the surface of the issues involved. However, it is
an area of study that can provide many insights into the law, governance,
and science. It can also provide great insight into relationship between these
areas of study.
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